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ABSTRACT 
What is an effective methodology for intelligence and terrorism information 
sharing within a private passenger rail organization and with their external public 
partners? This thesis uses three distinct research methodologies that collectively lead to 
an effective strategy for intelligence and terrorism information sharing within a private 
passenger railroad, and with its external public partners (Chapter III): 
1. Key Amtrak personnel will be interviewed to establish and confirm how 
intelligence information currently flows within Amtrak and with its 
external intelligence community and law enforcement partners (Chapter 
II). 
2. A survey of key Amtrak operations personnel to establish Amtrak’s 
intelligence priorities and requirements (Chapter IV). 
3. Two case studies on potential models for intelligence and terrorism 
information sharing (Chapters V and VI). 
There were two outcomes from this research: (1) by leveraging the power of 
informal networks in the context of the abstract megacommunity framework, an effective 
strategy for intelligence and terrorism information sharing was developed; and (2) based 
on the needs of front line railroad operating personnel, an intelligence product that helps 
to protect the public and the nation’s critical railroad infrastructure was developed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE WALL 
With over 80% of America’s critical infrastructure owned and operated by the 
private sector,1 the strategic value of a public – private partnership is paramount in the 
fight against terrorism. The recent release of information sharing strategies by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)2 and the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI)3 is an attempt by the federal government to build this partnership. 
Both these strategies, however, fall well short of meeting the requirements of the private 
sector. Within the United States (U.S.), intelligence and terrorism information sharing 
between the public and private sector is problematic, and remains a significant challenge 
for both parties. Intelligence and terrorism information is a critical enabler in the risk 
mitigation decision making process. The strategic deployment of assets and investment of 
limited capital funds is dependent on actionable intelligence.  
The root of this problem was first identified by the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence in response to the controversy surrounding the illegal activities of the Banca 
Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) and the Bank of Credit and Commercial International 
(BCCI) during the early 1990s. The Committee concluded that: 
The fundamental policy governing the relationship between law 
enforcement and intelligence needs to be addressed by the Attorney 
General and the DCI, in conjunction with the congressional oversight 
committees. Confusion is apparent on both sides as to what the proper role 
(and authority) of intelligence agencies is in circumstances like those  
 
 
                                                 
1 President George W. Bush, National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure 
and Key Assets (Washington, D.C.: The White House 2003), 8. 
2 Department of Homeland Security, Information Sharing Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_information_sharing_strategy.pdf 
(accessed June 8, 2008). 
3 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, U.S. Intelligence Community Intelligence Sharing 
Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008), 
http://www.dni.gov/reports/IC_Information_Sharing_Strategy.pdf (accessed June 8, 2008). 
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presented in the BNL case. Indeed, as the conclusions set forth below 
indicate, there are numerous and significant “disconnects” between the 
two functional areas.4 
After the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Congress began to seek legislative 
changes that could facilitate information sharing between the intelligence community and 
law enforcement. The Bremer Commission5 was established to review counterterrorism 
laws, regulations, directives, policies, and practices. In a June 2000 report to Congress, 
the Commission concluded: 
Law enforcement agencies are traditionally reluctant to share information 
outside of their circles so as not to jeopardize any potential prosecution. 
The FBI does promptly share information warning about specific terrorist 
threats with the CIA and other agencies. But the FBI is far less likely to 
disseminate terrorist information that may not relate to an immediate 
threat even though this could be of immense long-term or cumulative 
value to the intelligence community. . . . Moreover, certain laws limit the 
sharing of law enforcement information, such as grand jury or criminal 
wiretap information, with the intelligence community. These laws are 
subject to different interpretations, so that in some cases it is unclear 
whether the restrictions apply.6 
Despite recognizing the wall between the intelligence community and law 
enforcement, the White House and Congress rejected legislative proposals to remove the 
barrier through broader surveillance and information sharing powers. Attorney General 
William Barr testified before the 9/11 Commission stating that: 
For three decades leading up to 9/11, Congress was at the fore of a steady 
campaign to curtail the Bureau’s domestic intelligence activities and 
impose on all its activities the standards and process of the criminal justice 
system. These concerns made it extremely difficult for the Bureau to 
pursue domestic security matters outside the strictures of the criminal  
 
 
                                                 
4 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, The Intelligence Community’s Involvement in the Banca 
Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) Affair (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, 103rd Congress, 1st session, 
February 1993), 35 - 36. 
5 The Bremer Commission’s official title was the National Commission on Terrorism. It was headed 
by former Ambassador L. Paul Bremer. 
6 National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 2000), 15-16. 
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justice process. Prohibitions on sharing grand jury information with 
intelligence agencies and with using intelligence information in criminal 
investigations created a ‘wall of separation.’7 
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, all branches of the 
U.S. government agreed that information must be shared between the intelligence 
community and law enforcement. As a result of prior recognition of the problem and 
proposed legislative solutions, within one week of the attacks, a comprehensive bill was 
before Congress that would ultimately become the USA PATRIOT Act (“The Patriot 
Act”). The Patriot Act provides for significant relief from the restrictions on intelligence 
gathering within the U.S., and the sharing of information acquired during criminal 
investigations. Some of the more relevant sections of this complex law are as follows: 
• Section 203: Authority to Share Criminal Investigative Information 
• Section 504: Coordination with Law Enforcement 
• Section 905: Disclosure to Director of Central Intelligence of Foreign 
Intelligence-Related Information with Respect to Criminal Investigations.8 
Despite the authority and directive to share intelligence information, the 
intelligence community and law enforcement continue to struggle with its application. 
This has transcended all levels of government (federal, state, local, and tribal), and the 
private sector. Intelligence and terrorism information sharing between the public and 
private sector is no exception. 
B. PASSENGER RAIL AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”) is a private corporation 
incorporated in the District of Columbia. The Directors on the Amtrak Board are 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate with the exception of the 
Secretary of Transportation who holds a permanent Directors position. Although legally a 
private corporation, Amtrak is effectively a federal agency controlled by the federal 
                                                 
7 William P. Barr, “Statement of William P. Barr to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States,” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing6/witness_barr.htm (accessed February 29, 2008).  
8 For a detailed analysis of the entire law, please refer to Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
Report RL31377, The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis dated April 15, 2002 by Charles Doyle. 
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government. It services 525 stations, in 46 states, with 305 trains operating daily in a 
22,000 mile rail network. Millions of Americans rely on Amtrak to transport them safely 
to and from work each day. The operating personnel and infrastructure that makes this 
possible is a critical national asset.9 Protection of the traveling public and this critical 
national asset is vital to the survival of the U.S. economy and the corporation. 
The value proposition for passenger rail, in comparison to other modes, is easy 
access to affordable, frequent, high capacity transportation. However, this ease of access 
is what terrorists have exploited to perform attacks on passenger trains in Madrid, 
London, and Mumbai. The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis - Homeland 
Infrastructure Threat & Risk Analysis Center warns that the “U.S. commercial passenger 
and freight rail systems are vulnerable to terrorist attack because of their public 
accessibility and the difficulty in securing a vast array of railroad assets. Passenger trains 
and stations are especially attractive terrorist targets because of the large number of 
people in a concentrated area.”10 
In an attempt to mitigate this threat, passenger rail agencies have altered the focus 
of their police and security from traditional crime to counterterrorism tactics. They have 
conducted security needs assessments11 on their infrastructure and invested in security 
systems to lower the risk of an attack. They have provided security training to their 
employees and introduced programs such as “See Something, Say Something.”12 These 




                                                 
9 Government Accountability Office, Passenger Rail Security – Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed 
to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2005), 1. 
10 Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Strategic Sector Assessment 
– The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Commercial Passenger and Freight Rail System (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2006), 3.  
11 A security needs assessment includes an assessment of assets (criticality, threat, vulnerability, 
impact, and risk), response and recovery capabilities, and countermeasures.  
12 Metropolitan Transit Authority, “If You See Something, Say Something,” 
http://www.mta.info/mta/security/index.html (accessed December 25, 2007). 
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based on any guidelines, objectives, or priorities. The information is simply reported to 
the TSA Transportation Security Coordination Center (TSCC) in compliance with TSA 
Security Directive RAILPAX-04-02.13 
According to its own legislative guidelines, DHS is responsible for the collection, 
processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence reports that assist with the 
deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to terrorist attacks against the U.S.14 
Due to the lack of intelligence sharing, the status of information collected about terrorist 
attacks against passenger rail is not known. What is known is the processing and analysis 
of information collected to help deter, prevent, preempt, or respond to a terrorist attack 
against passenger rail is non-existent. Routine intelligence reports specific to the 
passenger rail sector are required to deploy the limited resources of each passenger rail 
agency effectively including the deployment of state and local resources. 
As a result, critical infrastructure protection is inadequate because the critical 
enabler is missing. Authorities in the rail system, for example, only have the word of 
DHS that they are at risk, and are ignorant as to the basis for the continued threat 
assertions. They cannot gauge the gravity of the threat, and thus, are in the dark as to how 
and how much to respond and where to put the emphasis. This is a critical vulnerability 
that shows no indications of improvement anytime soon. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What is an effective methodology for intelligence and terrorism information 
sharing within a private passenger rail organization and with their external public 
partners? 
The current intelligence reports and assessments from the DHS and the TSA 
provide broad threat information largely based on terrorist attacks that have occurred in 
other parts of the world. Knowledge of a general threat is helpful in raising the overall 
                                                 
13 Transportation Security Administration, Threat to Passenger Rail Systems – National Railroad 
Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK) and Alaska Railroad Corporation – SD RAILPAX-04-02 (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2004). 
14 107th United States Congress, Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Congress, November 25, 2002), Sec. 201 (d). 
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level of awareness and vigilance, but over time, it becomes the accepted norm. The threat 
of a terrorist attack on passenger rail becomes a backdrop similar to the threat of common 
crime in our society. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This research will be the first to identify the key factors and components of an 
effective intelligence and terrorism information sharing methodology between the public 
and private sector. It could form the basis for a doctoral study of the most effective 
methodology for the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence 
information. On its own, as a minimum, it will provide the basis for an intelligence 
sharing program between Amtrak and other private sector passenger rail entities 
responsible for public safety and critical infrastructure protection, and their public sector 
partners. For Homeland Security practitioners and policy makers, it will provide a 
valuable reference as they contemplate, develop, and implement related Homeland 
Security policies, strategies, and regulations. It will determine what intelligence 
information works and what does not work, and why, on the frontlines of transportation 
public safety and critical infrastructure protection. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review that follows will show that no meaningful legislation, 
policies, strategies, industry practices, or academic research has been put forth on public 
– private sector intelligence and terrorism information sharing. This is conclusively true 
when it comes to intelligence sharing with the passenger rail transportation sector. What 
it will show is that the existing literature only patronizes public – private sector 
intelligence sharing. This thesis will contribute new research to an area where none exists 
today.  
Literature on intelligence and terrorism information sharing between the public 
and the private sectors can be separated into three distinct areas: (1) federal documents; 
(2) documentation of private sector practices; and (3) academic studies.  
 7
A literature review of intelligence and terrorism information sharing between the 
public and the private sectors reveals that the federal government has created a 
substantial body of work. Upon analyzing the information, however, it is apparent that 
the problems are well defined, but the proposed solutions lack substance, and are based 
on very little collaboration with the private sector and civil society.15 Within the private 
sector, documented practices of intelligence and terrorism information sharing are not 
openly available to the public because of the need to protect corporate and national 
secrets. Academia’s focus has largely been on intelligence and terrorism information 
sharing between the various levels of government. There also appears to be no academic 
studies specific to information sharing between the public and private sectors.  
1. Federal Documents 
The need for intelligence and terrorism information sharing with the private sector 
was first recognized in Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) – Critical 
Infrastructure Protection issued by President Clinton on May 22, 1998. As one of the first 
legal documents to acknowledge the problem, it attempted to prescribe a solution by 
creating the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) and encouraging the 
creation of the Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC): 
Such a center could serve as the mechanism for gathering, analyzing, 
appropriately sanitizing and disseminating private sector information to 
both industry and the NIPC. The center could also gather, analyze and 
disseminate information from the NIPC for further distribution to the 
private sector.16 
PDD-63 recommended the ISACs be designed by the private sector, but emulate 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention since it has “proved highly effective, 
particularly it[s] extensive interchanges with the private and non-federal sectors.”17 This  
 
                                                 
15 Mark Gerencser et al., Megacommunities (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 56. 
16 President Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 63 – Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1998), 13. 
17 Ibid. 
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essentially left the design and function to the sectors that formed them. It is important to 
understand the ISAC concept and its history because it sets the government framework 
for information sharing with the private sector that still exists today. 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established DHS and created the Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate. All critical infrastructure 
protection (CIP) functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities within existing organizations, 
including the NICP, were transferred to IAIP. The act also made the IAIP responsible for 
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information to federal, state, and local 
governments, and the private sector. These responsibilities were subsequently assigned to 
the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis pursuant to the Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.18 Neither act prescribed a means 
of accomplishing these responsibilities.  
The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and 
Key Assets issued by DHS in February 2003 established five key objectives related to 
information sharing: 
• Define protection-related information sharing requirements and establish 
effective, efficient information sharing processes; 
• Implement the statutory authorities and powers of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 to protect security and proprietary information regarded as 
sensitive by the private sector; 
• Promote the development and operation of critical sector Information 
Sharing Analysis Centers; 
• Improve processes for domestic threat data collection, analysis, 
and dissemination to state and local government and private 
industry; 
• Support the development of interoperable secure communications 
systems for state and local governments and designated private 
sector entities; and 
• Complete implementation of the Homeland Security Advisory 
System.19 
                                                 
18 110th United States Congress, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Congress, August 3, 2007), Sec. 531 (a) (2). 
19 President George W. Bush, National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure 
and Key Assets (Washington, D.C.: The White House 2003), xi.  
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This DHS document acknowledges for the first time that there may be barriers to 
information sharing between the public and private sectors. It suggests that these 
impediments and disincentives be identified and appropriate measures be adopted to 
overcome these barriers. It does not suggest what the obstacles are or the appropriate 
measures to overcome them. The strategy also re-introduces the concept of ISACs by 
including the promotion of the development and operation of these entities. 
The problem of information sharing with the private sector is further recognized 
in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) – Directive on Critical 
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection issued by President George W. 
Bush on December 17, 2003. HSPD-7 encouraged DHS to collaborate with private sector 
entities to improve information sharing and analysis. However, it did not mention the 
ISACs or suggest solutions to overcoming the information sharing barriers with the 
private sector. The objectives are set out in clause 25 of HSPD-7: 
(25) In accordance with applicable laws or regulations, the Department 
and the Sector-Specific Agencies will collaborate with appropriate private 
sector entities and continue to encourage the development of information 
sharing and analysis mechanisms. Additionally, the Department and 
Sector-Specific Agencies shall collaborate with the private sector and 
continue to support sector-coordinating mechanisms: 
(a) to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical 
infrastructure and key resources; and  
(b) to facilitate sharing of information about physical and cyber threats, 
vulnerabilities, incidents, potential protective measures, and best 
practices.20 
These broad objectives did not define success through any measurable goals or a time 
frame for completion. 
The literature, post HSPD-7, focuses on attempting to change the behavior of 
either the federal government or private sector depending on the author of the document. 
The Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) and the National Infrastructure 
                                                 
20 President George W. Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 - Directive on Critical 
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2003). 
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Advisory Council (NIAC) issued at least six reports on the subject in the year-and-a-half 
period between January 2004 and July 2006.21 For the most part, these reports further 
define the problem and suggest that collaboration, at all levels of government and with 
the private sector, is the solution. However, they provide no details on how to accomplish 
this broad objective. 
Two of these studies and the subsequent reports focus on the issue of information 
sharing with the private sector. The first is the August 10, 2005 report on Homeland 
Security Information Sharing between Government and the Private Sector. It documents 
many of the barriers referred to by the President in the National Strategy for the Physical 
Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets. However, it offers few solutions to 
overcome the barriers. It could also be perceived as a response to the audits and reports 
issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2004. The second report, 
Public-Private Sector Intelligence Coordination dated July 11, 2006, confirms the earlier 
findings and offers eight specific recommendations developed by industry subject matter 
experts from federal, state, and local government entities, and the private sector. This 
report also includes four case studies that analyze the time, quality, quantity, and impact 
of information flow to and from the private sector. This may be the only analysis that 
attempts to quantify the problem. 
The GAO issued two reports in 2004 on how well DHS is sharing information 
with the private sector. The GAO reports provide an independent or neutral review of the 
issue. However, one must remember their mandate is to report and make 
recommendations to Congress on government agency inefficiencies, non-compliance, and 
effectiveness, not evaluate private sector performance. The first report, entitled Critical  
 
                                                 
21 The reports issued by the HSAC and its predecessor organization the National Infrastructure 
Advisory Council (NIAC) include: 
• Evaluation and Enhancement of Information Sharing and Analysis, NIAC, July 13, 2004. 
• Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative Final Report and Recommendations, December 200. 
• Homeland Security Intelligence and Information Fusion, April 28, 2005. 
• Homeland Security Information Sharing between Government and the Private Sector Final Report, August 
10, 2005. 
• Lessons Learned Information Sharing Initiative: Homeland Security Intelligence Requirements Process, 
December 2005. 
• Public-Private Sector Intelligence Coordination, NIAC, July 11, 2006. 
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Infrastructure Protection - Establishing Effective Information Sharing with Infrastructure 
Sectors dated April 21, 2004, focused on the status of the private sector ISACs. It 
reported that: 
• the current ISACs were established and developed based on the 
unique characteristics and needs of their individual sectors; 
• DHS and the sector-specific agencies have undertaken a number of 
efforts to address the public/private partnership called for by 
federal policy on critical infrastructure protection and to continue 
to develop their relationships with the ISACs and with each other; 
and 
• a number of challenges to the ISACs’ successful establishment, 
operation, and partnership with DHS and other federal agencies 
remain, some of which were described by the ISAC Council 
through a series of white papers.22 
The report did not recommend any specific actions that could be taken to improve the 
effectiveness of information sharing between the federal government and the private 
sector. 
The GAO’s second report, Critical Infrastructure Protection – Improving 
Information Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors dated July 9, 2004,23 focused on 
improving the efficiency, and effectiveness of information sharing between DHS and the 
ISACs. The report found that DHS could improve the effectiveness by developing an 
information sharing plan. This plan would define the roles and responsibilities of the 
stakeholders. It also found that DHS’s ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate 
information could be improved by developing a Homeland Security Intelligence (HSINT) 
doctrine. Like most GAO reports, it provides no details on the components of the plan, 
policies, or procedures. It simply points out they are missing. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Critical Infrastructure Protection – Improving 
Information Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2004), 2.  
23 Ibid. 
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On October 27, 2005, President Bush signed Executive Order 13388 – Further 
Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans, which ordered 
that the highest priority be given to the interchange of information between agencies, all 
levels of government, and the private sector. Section 1 of Executive Order 13388 makes 
the objective abundantly clear: 
Section 1. Policy. To the maximum extent consistent with applicable law, 
agencies shall, in the design and use of information systems and in the 
dissemination of information among agencies: 
(a) give the highest priority to … (iii) the interchange of terrorism 
information between agencies and appropriate authorities of State, local, 
and tribal governments, and between agencies and appropriate private 
sector entities; ....24 
On December 16, 2005, President Bush followed-up Executive Order 13388 by 
issuing a memorandum to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies entitled 
Guidelines and Requirements in Support of the Information Sharing Environment, which 
re-emphasized that information sharing is a high priority. It directed that, within 90 days 
of the memorandum, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) develop and issue 
common standards for sharing terrorism information with state, local, and tribal 
governments, law enforcement agencies, and the private sector. The memorandum also 
directed that within 180 days of the memorandum Secretary of Homeland Security and 
the Attorney General develop a common framework for the sharing of information with 
state, local, and tribal governments, law enforcement agencies, and the private sector. 
Pursuant to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the 
President established the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and tasked the Program 
Manager of the ISE to oversee and complete the tasks outlined in his December 16, 2005 
memorandum. In May 2006, the PM-ISE issued its recommendations in response to 
Guideline 2 in the President’s December 16, 2005 memorandum. The response 
recommended that: 
                                                 
24 President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13388 – Further Strengthening the Sharing of 
Terrorism Information To Protect Americans (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2005). 
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DHS must increase its ability to share information in a manner that 
protects the privacy, civil liberties, and other legal rights of individuals 
and corporations, as provided for under U.S. law, so that private sector 
entities can manage risks to their business enterprises, by: . . . 
Disseminating actionable alerts and warnings concerning specific private 
sectors that improve their situational awareness of terrorist threats and 
enable them to prioritize risks and security investments, and shape the 
development of plans to ensure the security, continuity, and resiliency of 
infrastructure operations. . . .25 
Pursuant to the requirements of the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act, the PM-ISE issued the ISE Implementation Plan in November 2006. The 
plan, and thus, the federal government, acknowledged that sharing information with the 
private sector remains a problem citing four key factors: 
First, significant distinctions among the seventeen critical infrastructure 
and key resources sectors as defined in HSPD-7 (e.g., regulatory regimes, 
number of players, willingness to collaborate) make it difficult to create a 
single approach to information sharing operations, structure, and 
processes. Second, the private sector reports that the demand from 
Federal, State, and local governments for critical infrastructure and other 
information since 9/11 has multiplied many times over, imposing more 
demands on industry to collect information and report it. Third, requests 
for such information are rarely coordinated or consistent, resulting in 
duplicative requests. Finally, from the private sector’s perspective, the 
interrelationships between Federal and SLT governments are 
ambiguous.26 
The ISE Implementation Plan offered no proposed solution to the problem of 
sharing terrorism information with the private sector. However, it acknowledged the 
efforts of the NIAC citing that their July 2006 report entitled Public-Private Sector 
Intelligence Coordination raised the same issues and reached the same conclusions. It  
 
 
                                                 
25 Program Manager – Information Sharing Environment (ISE), “Guideline 2 – Common Sharing 
Framework,” Information Sharing Environment, http://www.ise.gov/docs/guidance/guideline%202%20-
%20common%20sharing%20framework.pdf (accessed June 22, 2008). 
26 Program Manager – Information Sharing Environment (ISE), ISE Implementation Plan 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), 19 - 20. 
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also outlined the establishment of a standing subcommittee that will provide a forum to 
address related private sector issues. The Private Sector Subcommittee was specifically 
tasked to: 
Action 1.27 The Private Sector Subcommittee will produce a plan that 
implements elements of the framework as it affects the private sector. This 
plan must be consistent with statutes and Presidential direction and ensure 
that information and privacy and legal rights are adequately protected. 
(Planned Completion: Second Quarter, CY 2007) 
Action 2.22 The PM-ISE, in consultation with the ISC, will review the 
private sector sharing plan developed in Phase 1 and identify priorities for 
implementation. In addition, some of the recommendations are likely to 
entail issues requiring executive-level decisions or legislative changes. 
(Planned Completion: Fourth Quarter, CY 2007)27 
In January 2007, the PM-ISE and the ISC agreed, as part of their 
recommendations to Presidential Guidelines 2, to “. . .leverage the CI/KR sector 
partnership structure, as defined in the NIPP and managed through DHS, as the primary 
private sector coordination mechanism for the ISE.”28 The PM-ISE’s response to action 
1.27 and 2.22 above is a baseline document entitled The CI/KR Information Sharing 
Environment and dated April 2007 from the Department of Homeland Security – Office 
of Infrastructure Protection.29 According to the PM-ISE’s annual report, this “. . . 
baseline document will serve as a roadmap for improved private sector integration into 
the ISE.”30 At the time of this literature review, the author has not been able to locate a 
copy of The CI/KR Information Sharing Environment.  
On July 26, 2007, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Intelligence, 
Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing on Private Sector 
Information Sharing: What Is It, Who Does It, and What’s Working at DHS?. The 
                                                 
27 Program Manager – Information Sharing Environment (ISE), ISE Implementation Plan 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), 77. 
28 Program Manager – Information Sharing Environment (ISE), Annual Report to the Congress on the 
Information Sharing Environment (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007), 16. 
29 Ibid., 17. 
30 Ibid. 
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hearing was chaired by the Honorable Chairwoman Harman and the witnesses included 
key subject matter experts from DHS and the private sector. The DHS witnesses testified 
that they have made significant progress but a lot more remains to be done. The private 
sector witnesses testified that it is still not working and may be the worst it has ever been.  
Since this hearing, ODNI and DHS have issued Information Sharing Strategy 
documents.31,32 Neither of these strategy documents offers any meaningful solution to 
the problem of public – private sector intelligence sharing. The most promising progress 
has been made under the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group 
(ITACG) pursuant to the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 
of 2007.33 The March 2008 report, Establishing the Interagency Threat Assessment and 
Coordination Group, submitted to Congress by PM-ISE summarizes their 
accomplishments.34 Although there has been some progress on an overarching 
framework, a public – private sector intelligence sharing strategy remains illusive. The 
ITAG has yet to issue any intelligence sharing guidance or threat assessments specific to 
passenger rail.  
a. Summary of Federal Documents 
Ten years after PDD-63 was issued, much has been written by the federal 
government on the problem of sharing intelligence and terrorism information between the 
public and the private sectors. There have been presidential directives, executive orders, 
presidential memoranda, guidelines and requirements, national strategies and policies, 
GAO reports, working committees appointed by the President, and hearings in Congress, 
                                                 
31 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, U.S. Intelligence Community Intelligence Sharing 
Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008), 
http://www.dni.gov/reports/IC_Information_Sharing_Strategy.pdf (accessed June 8, 2008).  
32 Department of Homeland Security, Information Sharing Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_information_sharing_strategy.pdf 
(accessed June 8, 2008). 
33 110th United States Congress, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Congress, August 3, 2007), Sec. 521 (a). 
34 Program Manager – Information Sharing Environment (ISE), “Establishing the Interagency Threat 
Assessment and Coordination Group,” Information Sharing Environment, 
http://www.ise.gov/docs/reports/ITACG-CDA.pdf (accessed June 22, 2008). 
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but the problem still exists. The problem has been well defined by the foregoing 
literature, but no solutions or alternatives have emerged from this effort. 
2. Private Sector Practices 
Private sector practices on intelligence and terrorism information sharing with the 
public sector are not openly available. They protect this information for proprietary 
reasons and to lower the risk of their means and methods falling into the wrong hands. 
This could also lead to legal action against the corporation if private customer 
information becomes available to the general public. Interestingly, the casinos in Las 
Vegas may be one of the most advanced in sharing intelligence information with 
government agencies such as Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).35 This is done in an 
effort to thwart crimes like money laundering and drug trafficking. The quasi public – 
private sector nuclear electric power generation industry is another sector that may have 
procedures in place for sharing intelligence information with the government. However, 
both these examples are not supported by literature openly available to the public for the 
reasons stated earlier. 
In an effort to raise awareness and contribute the untapped private sector 
knowledge and resources, the private sector has started organizations such as the 
Homeland Security & Defense Business Council (the “Council”). The vision and mission 
of the Council is to “. . . promote the importance of the Private Sector in achieving the 
vision and mission for homeland security at a national level.”36 They attempt to achieve 
this by “. . . bring together the best leaders in the private and public sector through 
industry forums and activities that help to advance thought leadership, future policy, and 
best practices to advance the homeland security of the nation and the American 
people.”37 Off the record, representatives from private corporations that belong to the 
                                                 
35 Larry Barrett and Sean Gallagher, “Case 113 - What Sin City Can Teach Tom Ridge,” Baseline 
(April 2004). 
36 Homeland Security & Defense Business Council, “Council Vision, Mission, and Value Statement,” 
Homeland Security & Defense Business Council, http://www.homelandcouncil.org/aboutus.php (accessed 
July 12, 2008). 
37 Ibid. 
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Council state that intelligence sharing is unidirectional, with the private sector providing 
proprietary information to public sector intelligence agencies and getting no actionable 
intelligence in return. 
3. Academic Studies 
Very little has been studied and written on intelligence and terrorism information 
sharing with the private sector by academia. A review of the academic studies reveals 
that the subject of information sharing with the private sector is widely mentioned in 
studies on intelligence information sharing with state and local governments. However, 
the specific subject of sharing information with the private sector is not analyzed in any 
detail. It is simply considered the same as sharing intelligence information with state and 
local governments with no regard to the issues private sector entities present. This quote 
from a Master’s thesis is just one example of this point:  
Successful counterterrorism efforts require that Federal, State, tribal, local, 
and private-sector entities have an effective information sharing and 
collaboration capability to ensure they can seamlessly collect, blend, 
analyze, disseminate, and use information regarding threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences in support of prevention, response, and 
consequence management efforts.38 
There remains a clear need for the academic study of intelligence and terrorism 
information sharing between the public and private sectors. 
4.  Summary of Literature Review 
The foregoing literature review shows the definitive need for new research in the 
area of intelligence sharing. The analysis and conclusions by Judge Richard Posner in his 
books Preventing Surprise Attacks,39 Uncertain Shield – The U.S. Intelligence System in 
                                                 
38 Patrick Miller, “How Can We Improve Information Sharing Among Local Law Enforcement 
Agencies?” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 4. 
39 Richard A. Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing 
Group, 2006). 
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the Throes of Reform,40 and Countering Terrorism41 are excellent examples of the type 
of research that needs to be done, but specifically in the area of public – private sector 
intelligence sharing. Ideally, it would focus on intelligence and terrorism information 
sharing in the passenger rail transportation sector. This thesis is the first to answer the call 
for such research.  
F. METHOD 
The research methodology consists of three distinct components that will 
collectively lead to an effective strategy for intelligence and terrorism information 
sharing within a private passenger rail organization, and with their external public 
partners (Chapter III): 
1. Key Amtrak personnel will be interviewed to establish and confirm how 
intelligence information currently flows within Amtrak and with its 
external intelligence community and law enforcement partners (Chapter 
II). 
2. A survey of key Amtrak operations personnel to establish Amtrak’s 
intelligence priorities and requirements (Chapter IV). 
3. Two case studies on potential models for intelligence and terrorism 
information sharing (Chapters V and VI).  
The current flow of intelligence information within Amtrak and with its external 
partners will be established and confirmed by interviewing Amtrak’s Chief of Police, the 
head of Amtrak’s Police Intelligence Unit, and Amtrak’s VP of Transportation. The data 
collected from these interviews will be compared to generally accepted intelligence 
community and law enforcement practices. These practices will be validated through an 
interview with an experienced neutral member of law enforcement and the intelligence 
community.  
                                                 
40 Richard A. Posner, Uncertain Shield – The U.S. Intelligence System in the Throes of Reform 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2006). 
41 Richard A. Posner, Countering Terrorism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 
2007). 
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The narrative and testimonial data collected from this research will be analyzed 
for common themes using a qualitative evaluation process. The purpose of this analysis is 
to identify: 
1. The most useful and dependable sources of intelligence for Amtrak; 
2. The patterns and nodes of interaction; 
3. The nature of the information required to protect the public and critical 
infrastructure; 
4. The critical pathways for intelligence in an effective system; and 
5. The critical nodes and decision makers that require timely intelligence to 
protect the public and critical infrastructure. 
With the assistance of Amtrak’s Office of Security Strategy and Special 
Operations (intelligence and security policy units), Amtrak’s intelligence and terrorism 
information requirements will be defined and developed, by seeking input from key 
Amtrak personnel in the following railroad operating departments: 
1. Transportation (train operating crews, on-board service personnel, and 
station personnel); 
2. Engineering (infrastructure operations, maintenance, and engineering); 
3. Mechanical (locomotive and passenger car maintenance and engineering);  
4. Police (law enforcement); and  
5. Environmental, Health, and Safety (Environmental Protection Agency, 
Food and Drug Administration, and Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration requirements monitoring and compliance).  
Two case studies will be purposely analyzed to determine if they meet Amtrak’s 
intelligence and terrorism information sharing requirements. The first case study is on the 
New York Police Department (NYPD) SHIELD model. This case study will be 
qualitatively analyzed from two distinct perspectives: (1) NYPD SHIELD and (2) the 
private sector - Amtrak. The second case study is on the British Transport Police (BTP) 
Counterterrorism Unit model. The British Transport Police (BTP) practices in the United 
Kingdom (UK) will be comparatively analyzed with the practices in the U.S.  
This research will be the first to identify the key factors and components of a 
public – private sector intelligence and terrorism information sharing strategy using 
evidence driven analysis. 
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II. INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORISM INFORMATION 
SHARING WITH AND WITHIN AMTRAK TODAY 
This chapter will focus on establishing the status of intelligence and terrorism 
information sharing with and within Amtrak today.42 It is a point in time along a dynamic 
continuum of policies and practices.  
A. THE EXISTING MEANS AND METHODS 
During February and March 2008, the author interviewed Amtrak Chief of Police 
John O’Connor,43 Amtrak Police Inspector (Intelligence Unit) Neil Trugman,44 and Mr. 
Bart Johnson,45 Director for Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Support, Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence. The purpose of these interviews was to establish 
and confirm how intelligence information currently flows within Amtrak and with its 
external intelligence community and law enforcement partners. The testimonial data was 
a qualitative analysis to identify: 
1. The sources of intelligence for Amtrak; 
2. The patterns and nodes of interaction; 
3. The nature of the information; 
4. The pathways for intelligence; and 
5. The nodes and decision makers. 
1. Sources of Intelligence for Amtrak 
In all cases, DHS, the FBI, and the FBI Joint Terrorism Taskforce Force (JTTF) 
were cited as the most dependable external source of intelligence. State and local sources 
                                                 
42 For the purpose of this thesis, the status is as of March 2008. 
43 Chief John O’Connor has over 35 years of dedicated law enforcement service in railroad policing. 
Prior to joining Amtrak, he was the Chief of Police for Long Island Railroad. 
44 Neil Trugman was formerly a Detective (Grade One) with the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan 
Police Gang Intelligence Unit. He retired after 27 years of dedicated service. 
45 Major Bart Johnson retired from the New York State Police after 25 years of dedicated service to 
join the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. When he retired from the New York State Police in 
January 2008, he was the founding head of their Counterterrorism Intelligence Preparedness Response 
Program (an early version of the state fusion center).  
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such as state and local fusion centers (SLFC) were noticeably absent as a source of 
intelligence. The credibility of the information was dependent on the credibility of the 
source. This seems obvious, but it is critical to understanding the behavior of the risk 
mitigation decision makers. For example, if the source of the information is determined 
to be credible, the intelligence officer46 will take appropriate action to reduce the risk 
associated with the threat. The intelligence officer, however, would invariably delay these 
actions, by days in some cases, to confirm the credibility of the source. Consistently, the 
source was deemed to be credible if it came from one of two areas (the “Credible 
Sources”): (1) foreign intelligence from locations such as the training camps in the tribal 
provinces of Pakistan; and (2) domestic intelligence from local police investigations. In 
all cases, the intelligence information was provided by a source external to Amtrak.  
2. Pattern and Nodes of Interaction 
When intelligence on a domestic threat is received by the intelligence community 
and law enforcement, an informal network engages in what can be best described as 
social exchanges of trust in an effort to determine if the intelligence information can be 
traced back to one of the two aforementioned sources. According to Major Bart Johnson, 
“You get it [intelligence] officially, and then you start working through the unofficial 
channels of your network.”47 These informal social networks consist of individuals who 
have earned the trust of at least one other individual in the network. As Major Johnson 
states, “official channels and unofficial channels work wonderful. Sometimes the 
unofficial work better.”48 
3. Nature of the Information 
Intelligence must include enough specificity to enable actions that reduce the risk 
associated with the threat. The specificity would include more than one of the following: 
                                                 
46 Intelligence officer includes intelligence and law enforcement personnel engaged in the function of 
gathering information. 
47 Bart Johnson (Director for Homeland Security and Law Enforcement, Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence), interview with the author, Washington, D.C., February 8, 2008. 
48 Ibid. 
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1. the nature of the threat; 
2. the delivery method; 
3. location;  
4. date and/or time; and  
5. the asset to be attack.  
This is analogous to having physical evidence in a crime investigation. According to 
Amtrak Police Inspector Neil Trugman,  
In law enforcement, there is nothing stronger than physical evidence, 
finger prints and DNA and in terrorism you don’t have the opportunity for 
finger prints and DNA, unfortunately, until it’s done. When you have a 
map and photographs, and writings of what is going to be done …, and 
you see that came from an interview, that is good physical evidence.49 
According to Amtrak Chief of Police John O’Connor, it is “Traditional law 
enforcement. Once you have information that specific you pull out all the stops. The 
danger to the public is too great.”50 The nature of the information is also a key secondary 
variable in determining the credibility of the source. It is a secondary variable because 
often the information includes the necessary specifics, but is not credible because it 
cannot be traced to one of the two Credible Sources.  
4. Pathways for Intelligence 
This research showed that threat information typically flows from the DHS or FBI 
to an intelligence officer where the source is validated and confirmed in their personal 
informal network to be one of the two Credible Sources. Once the credibility of the threat 
information is confirmed, the intelligence officer will then take action to mitigate the risk 
independent of those individuals responsible and accountable for the protection of the 
public and critical infrastructure. On the surface this seems simple, but the effort on the 
part of the intelligence officer to validate and confirm the source credibility is time 
                                                 
49 Neil Trugman (Amtrak Police Inspector), interview with the author, Washington, D.C., February 25, 
2008.  
50 John O’Connor (Amtrak Chief of Police), interview with the author, Washington, D.C., February 
21, 2008. 
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consuming and ineffective. Amtrak Police Inspector Neil Trugman captures this 
inefficiency and how it could potentially be eliminated in the following statement: 
The experience of law enforcement to marry up with analytical people is 
really the lesson learned. The analysts look at a situation and analyze it to 
great detail. Law enforcement has the experience to implement plans and 
to prevent things from happening. I think that ended up being the lessons 
learned here. We needed to include the federal agencies that were getting 
this information and the analytical people that were getting this 
information and putting into the computer systems that we were able to 
read, we had to include the investigative people, the intelligence and law 
enforcement people, because they have insight of the potential of this 
actually happening or not happening.51 
5. Decision Making Nodes 
There are three critical decision making nodes: (1) the intelligence provider; (2) 
the domestic intelligence officer; and (3) the position(s) accountable for protecting the 
public and critical infrastructure. The intelligence provider is the Credible Source agency 
or individual, and the intelligence officer is usually the head of counterterrorism bureau, 
but is often a lower level officer assigned to coordinating intelligence. The narrative and 
testimonial interview data clearing shows that law enforcement views it the responsibility 
of their senior leadership to take action and protect the public and the critical 
infrastructure. Amtrak Police Inspector Neil Trugman espouses: 
The day police officers get out of the academy they are taught how to 
prevent things from happening. The federal agencies historically are 
investigating things after they occur and they really didn’t have a 
preventive measure, except maybe in spying. For the most part they are 
new to this, in preventing things from happening. They were always an 
investigative leg to handle situations after they happen. Where cops, state 
and local law enforcement, have always in the beginning always learned 
how to prevent.52 
In the private sector, this is the Chief Operating Officer and their critical operating 
personnel. 
                                                 




Figure 1 summarizes and illustrates Amtrak’s current means and methods of 
acquiring and verifying intelligence. The research showed that there is no formal 
connection between the intelligence community (ODNI – NCTC53), law enforcement 
(FBI), and private sector passenger rail railroads such as Amtrak. The threat information 



























Figure 1.   Amtrak’s current means and methods of acquiring intelligence. 
B. SUMMARY 
This chapter established the network Amtrak currently relies on for intelligence 
and terrorism information. Like most passenger rail organizations, Amtrak: 
• Relies on DHS, the FBI, and the FBI JTTF field offices for official 
intelligence. SLFCs are noticeably absent as a source for intelligence and 
threat information. Also noticeably absent is a routine means of processing 
threat information from local authorities; 
• Verifies and confirms intelligence using an informal network of personal 
contacts with the intelligence community and law enforcement; 
• Verifies and confirms the credibility of the intelligence source before 
taking action; 
                                                 
53 NCTC is the abbreviation for the National Counterterrorism Center. 
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• Requires some specifics on the nature of the threat, delivery method, 
location, date – time, or asset to be attacked before taking action;  
• Relies on law enforcement to take the lead in mitigating the risk associated 
with the threat; 
• The existing means and methods is not intelligence analysis, it is report 
processing and management. The law enforcement officer becomes both 
the analyst and the crisis manager; and 
• The existing model lacks synthetic diagnostics and prognostic analytical 
techniques. 
The foregoing research has largely focused on the history and current status of 
intelligence sharing between public and private (Amtrak) sector agencies. The remaining 
chapters will focus on three interrelated threads:  
1. A proposed strategy for public – private sector passenger rail intelligence 
and terrorism information sharing; 
2. Defining the intelligence priorities and requirements for passenger rail 
(Amtrak); and 
3. Defining the dissemination criteria for intelligence and terrorism 
information in the passenger rail transportation sector.  
It will show why the proposed strategy is effective through two case studies (Chapters V 
and VI) and will conclude with the resources recommended to implement and execute the 
strategy.  
The next chapter will propose a public – private sector passenger rail intelligence 
and terrorism information sharing strategy. It will present a theoretical analysis of why 
information is chosen to be shared, or not shared. Based on this understanding, the final 
sections of this chapter will present an intelligence and terrorism information sharing 
strategy for passenger rail. 
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III. INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORISM INFORMATION 
SHARING STRATEGY 
The biggest impediment to all-source analysis – to a greater likelihood of 
connecting the dots – is the human or systemic resistance to sharing 
information.54 
The 9/11 Commission claimed that it is human nature to resist sharing 
information. In making this unsubstantiated claim, they did not attempt to understand the 
social psychology of information sharing before making sweeping recommendations 
regarding this perceived problem. When designing a system or network for the sole 
purpose of sharing information, it is important to understand the social laws of human 
behavior. According to psychologist, Dr. Phil Zimbardo, “. . . situations interact to 
generate behavior; people are always acting within various behavioral contexts. People 
are both products of their different environments and producers of the environments they 
encounter.”55 The resistance to sharing information may be more of a response to the 
situation, structure, systems or rules that have been created around information sharing, 
than a human behavior. 
A literature review on the social psychology of information sharing reveals that a 
significant amount of research has been done using network analysis to connect the dots 
and root out terrorists before they strike. Some of the significant, and well debated, 
academic literature on network analysis as it relates to terrorism includes: 
1. Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy by 
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt;56 
2. “Networks, Netwar, and Information-age Terrorism” by John Arquilla, 
David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini;57 
                                                 
54 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 
416. 
55 Dr. Phil Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect (New York, NY: Random House, 2008), 319. 
56 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 
Militancy (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2001). 
57 John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-age 
Terrorism,” in Countering the New Terrorism, ed. Ian O. Lesser et al., (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999).  
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3. “Uncloaking Terrorist Networks” by Valdis Krebs’;58  
4. Understanding Terror Networks by Marc Sageman;59 and 
5. Social Network Analysis: A Handbook by John P. Scott.60 
Instead of focusing on rooting out evil, what if network theory was used to 
improve day-to-day information sharing and communication so good things could be 
done with accurate intelligence? Before answering this question, however, it is important 
to understand what makes people share information in some situations and withhold it in 
others. What is the psychology of information sharing? 
A. PSYCHOLOGY OF INFORMATION SHARING 
During the 9/11 hearings, Attorney General William Barr, referred to the inability 
of the intelligence community and law enforcement to share information as the “. . . wall 
of separation.”61 The wall being the situation, the official system, the structure, as well as 
the long standing rules of engagement between the intelligence community and law 
enforcement agencies, or a virtual firewall. While conducting research interviews on 
intelligence sharing, the author uncovered an informal network of weak ties between the 
intelligence community and law enforcement. This highly effective and efficient informal 
network routinely thwarts the firewall with social exchanges of trust to establish the 
source credibility of the intelligence. If it is possible to understand why information is 
openly and freely shared in informal networks, but not in formal networks, it may be 
possible to duplicate the situation for the purpose of efficient intelligence sharing. 
 
                                                 
58 Valdis Krebs’, “Uncloaking Terrorist Networks,” First Monday, 
http://www.firstmonday.org/Issues/issue7_4/krebs/ (accessed May 29, 2008). 
59 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004). 
60 John P. Scott, Social Network Analysis: A Handbook (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 
2000). 
61 William P. Barr, “Statement of William P. Barr to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States,” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing6/witness_barr.htm (accessed February 29, 2008). 
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As with any relationship, communication and information sharing is highly 
dependent on trust. The more trust in a relationship, the more open and free flowing the 
communication and value of the information. In his book, The Speed of Trust, Stephen 
M.R. Covey successfully argues the merits of trust in relationships: 
Trust impacts us 24/7, 365 days a year. It undergirds and affects the 
quality of every relationship, every communication, every work project, 
every business venture, every effort in which we are engaged. It changes 
the quality of every present moment and alters the trajectory and outcomes 
of every future moment of our lives – both personally and 
professionally.62  
Thomas Freidman, in his best selling book, The World is Flat, supports Covey’s 
argument with this statement: 
Without trust, there is no open society, because there are not enough 
police to patrol every opening in an open society. Without trust, there can 
also be no flat world, because it is trust that allows us to take down walls, 
remove barriers and eliminate friction at borders.63 
While conducting research at the Institute for Knowledge-Based Organization for 
their book, The Hidden Power of Social Networks, Rob Cross and Andrew Parker 
determined that two types of trust play a significant role in information flow: benevolence 
– based and competence – based trust.64 Benevolence – based trust focuses on 
vulnerability or trusting someone to not make light of, or expose, your lack of knowledge 
on a subject. Competence – based trust focuses on ability or trusting someone’s opinion 
such that one’s thinking is reshaped. When these two components are present in a 
relationship, information is shared efficiently and effectively. In an informal network, the 
connection or relationship between two individuals exists because of the presence of  
 
 
                                                 
62 Stephen M.R. Covey, The Speed of Trust (New York, NY: Free Press, 2006), 1 – 2. 
63 Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century (New York, 
NY: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005), 394.  
64 Rob Cross and Andrew Parker, The Hidden Power of Social Networks (Boston, MA: Harvard 
Business School Publishing, 2004), 99. 
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these two types of trust. During a research interview on intelligence sharing, Amtrak 
Chief of Police, John O’Connor, captured the essence of benevolence – based and 
competence – based trust in this statement: 
I would reach out to a couple of high ranking transportation law 
enforcement people where I value their opinion. Within the corporation, I 
would reach out to our stakeholders and those whose opinion I value. 
When I say that it is without regard to rank, it may be someone in the 
police organization at a lower rank because I like the way they think . . .65 
The strength of this connection or tie, and therefore, the level of information sharing, is 
directly dependent on the level of benevolence – based and competence – based trust in 
the relationship. During their research at the Institute for Knowledge-Based Organization, 
Rob Cross and Andrew Parker observed that: 
When someone provided access to a limited or sensitive resource, 
information seekers often took it as a sign that the person viewed them as 
trustworthy. This, in turn, often promoted reciprocal trust in the person 
sought for information.66 
Official networks have forced connections that are not built on this foundation and often 
lack both kinds of trust. The connection between two individuals exists solely because of 
their respective positions and areas of responsibility. This is why socializing with new 
business acquaintances over lunch, or sharing a round of golf, improves communication 
and strengthens the relationship. The level of both types of trust in the relationship 
usually improves after these types of social engagements. 
Now that it is understood that benevolence – based and competence – based trust 
is the catalyst for information sharing in informal networks, it may be possible to 
duplicate the situational benefits formally through network analysis without rebuilding 
the impeding walls. 
                                                 
65 John O’Connor (Amtrak Chief of Police), interview with the author, Washington, D.C., February 
21, 2008. 
66 Rob Cross and Andrew Parker, The Hidden Power of Social Networks (Boston, MA: Harvard 
Business School Publishing, 2004), 102. 
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B. NETWORK ANALYSIS 
In his controversial and widely debated article, “Networks, Netwar, and 
Information-age Terrorism,” John Arquilla claimed that: “It takes a network to fight a 
network.”67 There are currently two academically accepted approaches to network 
analysis: social and organizational. Social network analysis attempts to model networks 
visually and mathematically. Organizational network analysis focuses on how a network 
functions or how it operates. 
1. Social Network Analysis 
Social network analysis uses visual topologies and mathematics to model and 
measure the efficiency, effectiveness, and resiliency of a network. There are three basic 
network topologies as shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.   Network Topologies.68 
The points in the network are commonly referred to as nodes, and the connection 
between nodes are referred to as links or ties. The chain network forces end-to-end 
communication through the intermediate nodes. In a star, or hub, network 
communication between edge nodes flows through a central node, or hub. An all-channel 
                                                 
67 John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-age 
Terrorism,” in Countering the New Terrorism, ed. Ian O. Lesser et al., (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 
55. 
68 Ibid., 50. 
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network is a collaborative network where any node can communicate directly with 
another node. Although there are many other network topologies, their basic structure is a 
derivative of one, or more, of these three. It should be noted, however, that the foregoing 
topologies are not representative of known terror networks. Their purpose in this analysis 
is to provide a conceptual framework.  
Official networks, such as the intelligence community and law enforcement 
agencies, have hierarchical or centralized topologies where a central node or leader 
controls the network. Informal networks have all-channel or decentralized topologies that 
are leaderless. Until the advent of network theory, the belief has tended to be that a 
centralized structure is more effective and efficient than a decentralized one because it is 
easy to understand the relationships, and it is clear who is in charge. Recent studies have 
shown that, in some cases, centralized networks are no match for leaderless decentralized 
networks. The power of decentralization is evident in such human networks as Napster, 
Skype, Craigslist, Apache, Wikipedia, and Burning Man.69 Each of these networks is 
leaderless, but extremely effective and efficient at accomplishing their intended goal. One 
of their most important characteristics is a tendency to become more open and 
decentralized when they are challenged.70 For example, when the record industry 
shutdown Napster and Kazaa, it resulted in eMule, which is a leaderless and an even 
more decentralized music distribution network.71  
2. Organizational Network Analysis 
Organizational network analysis concentrates on the design and performance of a 
network. According to John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “. . . the design and 
performance of such networks depend on what happens across five levels of analysis 
(which are also levels of practice):”72 
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(d) technological; and 
(e) social.  
The organizational level refers to the resiliency of the network design. The 
narrative level is the story behind the network, and the doctrine is the collaborative 
strategies and methods. The technology level refers to the systems that facilitate the 
information sharing. The social level is the personal ties that assure loyalty and trust. 
According to John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, the strength of a network is dependent 
on achieving success across all five levels:  
The strongest networks will be those in which the organizational design is 
sustained by a winning story and a well-defined doctrine, and in which all 
this is layered atop advanced communications systems and rests on strong 
personal and social ties at the base. Each level, and the overall design, may 
benefit from redundancy and diversity. Each level's characteristics are 
likely to affect those of the other levels.73 
Good, if not great, things can be accomplished with the knowledge that 
information sharing is best accomplished in resilient, decentralized networks of weak ties 
that have a known purpose, collaborative strategies, technological systems, and most 
importantly, social strength built on trust. The next section will focus on how this 
knowledge can be applied to intelligence sharing. 
C. INTELLIGENCE SHARING STRATEGY CANVAS 
A strategy canvas is an analytic and action framework that serves two purposes. It 
captures the current state, and presents the value innovation of the desired future state.74 
Figure 3 illustrates the strategy canvas for passenger rail intelligence sharing. The dashed  
 
                                                 
73 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 
Militancy (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2001), 324. 
74 Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School 
Press, 2005), 25. 
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line illustrates that Amtrak’s intelligence priorities and requirements are not being met, 














Policies and strategies that mitigate risk through intelligence and terrorism 
information sharing.





Current State Future State
 
Figure 3.   Intelligence and terrorism information sharing strategy canvas. 
According to Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne, the desired future state can be 




• Which of the factors that the industry takes for granted should be 
eliminated? 
• Which factors should be reduced well below the industry’s standard? 
• Which factors should be raised well above the industry’s standard? 
• Which factors should be created that the industry has never offered?75 
Table 1 summarizes the actions that should be taken to achieve Amtrak’s intelligence 
priorities, and increase the value of the intelligence products. The solid line in Figure 3 
conceptually shows the future value after taking these actions. 
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Table 1.   Four actions that will improve intelligence and terrorism information sharing. 
In Blue Ocean Strategy, Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne assert that a good 
business strategy has three characteristics: (1) focus; (2) divergence; and (3) a compelling 
tagline.76 Focus eliminates diffusing efforts across all the possible options. Divergence 
breaks away from what others are doing to look at alternatives. A compelling tagline 
                                                 
75 Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School 
Press, 2005), 29. 
76 Ibid., 37. 
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brings immediate clarity to the strategy. These characteristics are also inherent in an 
effective intelligence sharing strategy. The proposal presented in this thesis focuses on 
intelligence led situational awareness for the passenger rail operating environment. It is 
specifically designed not to duplicate the intelligence provided by the intelligence 
community and law enforcement. The compelling tag line is intelligence led situational 
awareness. 
D. A STRATEGY FOR PUBLIC – PRIVATE SECTOR PASSENGER RAIL 
While policy makers and homeland security practitioners struggle with the 
application and implementation of the laws enacted in the aftermath of 9/11, Amtrak 
operates 305 trains daily without actionable intelligence and terrorism information reports 
under the persistent threat of terrorism. The findings from the foregoing evidence driven 
research collectively lead to the urgent need for a new strategy. Figure 4 illustrates a 
proposed network for intelligence and terrorism information sharing within a private 
passenger railroad and with its external partners, federal, state, and local government, and 
the private sector. The links, or ties, in Figure 4 conceptually show the interconnections, 
or relationships, required for intelligence and terrorism information sharing within 

































Figure 4.   A new intelligence sharing network for public – private passenger rail. 
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E. MEGACOMMUNITIES AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING NETWORKS 
The members external to Amtrak in the intelligence network presented in Figure 4 
can be organized into three groups: (1) Government; (2) Civil Society; and (3) Business. 
Figure 5 conceptually illustrates the external members categorized by these three groups. 
The position of each entity relative to each other is not important. What is important is 
the assigned group. The interconnection of the groups shown in Figure 5 forms what is 





























Figure 5.   Passenger rail intelligence sharing megacommunity. 
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According to Mark Gerencser et al.,: 
Megacommunities are not large communities of people; they are 
communities of organizations whose leaders and members have 
deliberately come together across national, organizational, and sectoral 
boundaries to reach goals they cannot achieve alone.77  
This megacommunity network is focused on the common goal of acquiring and sharing 
intelligence and threat information specific to passenger rail. Information is shared 
among the members based on benevolence and competency based trust. The strength and 
performance of the network comes from the presence of organizational, narrative, 
doctrinal, technological, and social levels. The organizational design is sustained by the 
nobility of protecting America’s passenger rail system layered atop of the continuing 
advance of modern communication systems, which is built upon personal and social ties.  
In the groundbreaking research article, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” Mark 
Granovetter argued that “. . . individuals with few weak ties will be deprived of 
information from distant parts of the social system and will be confined to the provincial 
news and views of their close friends.”78 Stated in the positive form, social systems with 
weak ties receive information earlier than those with only strong ties. The evidence 
presented by Granovetter suggests that social networks with weak ties are able to 
organize more quickly to take action. He also asserted that weak ties are “. . . important 
because their likelihood of being bridges is greater than (and that of strong ties less than) 
would be expected from their numbers alone.”79 A bridge, in this case, is defined as a 
connection between groups, cliques, or nodes in a social network such as a 
megacommunity. Based on Granovetter’s weak tie theory, Mark Gerencser et al., argue 
that: 
 
                                                 
77 Mark Gerencser et al., Megacommunities (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 28. 
78 Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited,” Sociological Theory 
(1983): 202. 
79 Ibid., 229. 
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In order to form or activate a megacommunity, leaders must utilize weak 
ties to reach out beyond their sector, beyond their geographical location, 
and access the latent connections of the networked world. Without weak-
tie connections, the megacommunity will not grow appropriately, 
information will not spread, relationships will not build, and a diversity of 
opinions will not be incorporated.80 
A megacommunity with its groups linked by informal weak ties is more efficient and 
effective than a network based on formal strong ties. Gerencser et al., assert that: 
Weak ties bring information into the network that is not provided by the 
members with “strong” ties. Indeed, people with many “weak ties” (or 
casual and temporary acquaintances) are often better informed and better 
equipped to share information than people with a few “strong ties” to close 
friends and family members.81  
Figure 6 illustrates the strength of weak ties in the proposed intelligence and 
terrorism information network from Figure 4. It conceptually shows how weak ties 
expand the network at the edges and interconnect previously disconnected key nodes. 
                                                 
80 Mark Gerencser et al, Megacommunities (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 136. 







Figure 6.   The strength of weak ties in Amtrak’s intelligence sharing model. 
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During a briefing on Amtrak’s security strategy with the author, Brian Jenkins 
captured the essence of the weak tie theory as it applies to intelligence networks with this 
statement: 
Do not formalize the [intelligence] network. If you formalize it, it is 
doomed. Keep it an informal working group.82  
The less codified the network, the more freely information will flow. The emphasis 
should be on collaborative relationships built on trust; not codifying the relationship with 
lengthy memorandums of understanding or other legal instruments. 
F. SUMMARY  
This chapter presented a public – private sector intelligence and terrorism 
information sharing network for passenger rail. It concluded that: 
• Benevolence – based and competence – based trust between individuals is 
the catalyst for sharing information in an informal network; 
• Information sharing is best accomplished in resilient, decentralized 
networks of weak ties that have a known purpose, collaborative strategies, 
technological systems, and most importantly, social strength built on trust; 
• The proposed intelligence and terrorism information sharing network for 
passenger rail is stronger and more effective if it includes weak ties built 
around the conceptual framework of a megacommunity; 
• The proposed intelligence and terrorism sharing network will include 
members from government (public sector), business (private sector), and 
civil society; 
• The less codified the network, the more freely information will flow; and 
• The emphasis should be on collaborative relationships built on trust; not 
codifying the relationship with lengthy memorandums of understanding or 
other legal instruments. 
The next chapter will present the remaining two threads: 
1. It will define the intelligence priorities and requirements for passenger rail 
(Amtrak); and 
2. It will define the dissemination criteria for passenger rail (Amtrak) 
intelligence and terrorism information. 
                                                 
82 Brian Jenkins (Senior Advisor, RAND), informal briefing session with the author, Washington, 
D.C., June 17, 2008. 
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IV.  DEFINING AMTRAK’S INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS 
The last chapter presented a strategy for intelligence and terrorism information 
sharing in the passenger rail transportation sector. For this strategy to be effective, it is 
critical that the intelligence requirements or goals, and the dissemination criteria be 
clearly defined. This chapter will focus on these two objectives.  
A. THE GLOBAL THREAT TO PASSENGER RAIL 
On February 29, 2008, the TSA issued a mass transit (passenger rail) threat 
assessment that concluded previous rail attacks in Madrid (March 2004), London (July 
2005), and Mumbai (July 2006) could inspire terrorists to conduct similar attacks in the 
U.S. The assessment states that mass transit and passenger rail systems are vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks because they are accessible to large numbers of the public and are 
difficult to secure. Multiple improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and improvised 
incendiary devices (IIDs) are the most common means of attacking mass transit targets. 
Although this threat assessment is seemingly obvious, it reflects the reality of global 
terrorism. A copy is contained in Appendix A.83 
B. AMTRAK’S INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS 
There are three key issues when defining intelligence requirements: (1) the 
priorities, which come from the policy makers and field users; (2) the types of 
information required; and (3) to whom and how often it should be disseminated. The first 
two are dependent on one another and highly interrelated, and therefore, will be presented 
together in the next section. The third key issue will be presented in the subsequent 
section. Collectively, this information did not exist prior to completing this research. 
                                                 
83 TSA Office of Intelligence, Mass Transit System Threat Assessment (Washington, D.C.: 
Transportation Security Administration, February 2008), 2. 
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1. Priorities and the Type of Information 
The intelligence should focus on risks to the traveling public and critical 
infrastructure. With the assistance of Amtrak’s Office of Security Strategy and Special 
Operations, the author developed Amtrak’s intelligence priorities and requirements based 
on significant input from corporate and division operating personnel. Key positions were 
identified in the organization as critical nodes based on their span of control and 
responsibility. The key positions, or critical nodes, that assisted with the development of 
Amtrak’s intelligence priorities and requirements are: Vice President Transportation, 
Chief Engineer, Chief Mechanical Officer, Chief of Police, General Superintendents, 
Division Engineers, Master Mechanics, Deputy Chiefs of Police; and Intelligence 
Officers (the “Critical Nodes”). A total of 33 individuals were consulted who collectively 
have over 800 years of railroad operating experience. 
Table 2 is a compilation of the interview and survey results. Cumulatively, it 
specifies Amtrak’s intelligence priorities and requirements in the form of questions and 
the type of information required in each answer. Collectively, the answered questions 
provide threat information and a detailed image of the operating environment: 
 
Intelligence Priorities & Requirements 
Questions to be Answered Types of Information 
1. What natural events will impact Amtrak 
operations? 
• Weather (predicted or actual – flood, hurricane, 
wildfire, tornado, earthquake, snow, mud 
slides, excessive heat or cold, etc.) 
2. What infrastructure events will impact Amtrak 
operations? 
• Fire/Explosion (accidental or equipment 
failure) 
• Accidents adjacent to/in vicinity of right-of-
way (e.g., gasoline tanker accident on adjacent 
highway) 
• HAZMAT incidents adjacent to/in vicinity of 
right-of-way (e.g., gas leaks) 
• Loss of power 
• Construction/mandated closures (structural, not 
security related closures) 
• Military movements/activities (e.g., missile 
launches from Vandenberg AFB) 
• Bridge strikes 
• Movable bridge strikes 
• Movable bridge failures 
 45
Intelligence Priorities & Requirements 
Questions to be Answered Types of Information 
• Derailments 
• Slow order applications to infrastructure events 
(e.g., concrete tie replacement, Sperry car, 
geometry car) 
• Communication system failures 
• Signal system failures 
• Catenary wire down 
• Broken rail 
• Theft of property (e.g., copper wire)84 
3. What anticipated political activities will impact 
Amtrak operations? 
• Movement of VIPs (e.g., POTUS movements, 
Pope’s visit to D.C. and NY) 
• Planned demonstrations (e.g., 
animal/environmental rights activists protesting 
near train stations or using rail for transport 
to/from demonstration site) 
• Current political issues (e.g., Tibet protests 
against Olympic torch) 
• Union strikes (Amtrak and freight) 
• International incidents/policy decisions that 
might cause terrorist backlash (e.g., Paris riots; 
Mohammed media cartoons; Israeli/Arab peace 
talks/conflicts) 
4. What are the threats to transportation nodes in 
general, and rail nodes in particular? 
• International threats 
• Domestic threats 
o Threats to employees 
o Threats to passengers 
o Threats to facilities 
5. What events have occurred which would 
warrant increased vigilance by Amtrak? 
• International terrorist attacks against 
transportation facilities 
• Domestic terrorist attacks 
6. What criminal activities will impact Amtrak 
operations? 
• Trespassing 
• Vandalism damaging critical infrastructure 
• Sabotage 
• Assault of Amtrak employees 
• Theft (e.g., recent theft of copper electrical 
traction returns) 
• Arson 
• Bomb threats 
                                                 
84 Railroads have recently experienced an increase in the theft of copper wire cables. The cables are 
used in operationally vital systems such train control (signal) and communication as well as electrical 
traction power systems. The perpetrators sell the cables at scrap metal dealers for the value of the copper, 
which has risen significantly in recent months. 
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Intelligence Priorities & Requirements 
Questions to be Answered Types of Information 
7. What domestic or international terrorist 
organizations are planning on attacking 
domestic rail facilities, and where will they 
attack? 
• Left-wing terrorism 
• Right-wing terrorism 
• Single issue (e.g., Earth Liberation Front (ELF) 
or Animal Liberation Front (ALF)) terrorism 
• Ethnic terrorism 
• Religious terrorism (e.g., Islamic radicalization) 
8. What terrorism indicators have occurred? • Surveillance (physical/photographic/IT) • Reconnaissance (physical/digital) 
• Increase in chatter/threats 
• Trespassing 
• Theft of security materials (e.g., IDs, uniforms, 
documents) 
• Purchase of IED/explosive components 
• Rehearsals/dry runs 
• Discovery of suspect devices 
9. What terrorism pre-incident indicators have 
occurred? 
• Surveillance 
o physical and photographic surveillance 
o Electronic surveillance (e.g., hacking, 
phishing, systemic information 
gathering) 
• Trespassing 
• Theft of security materials (e.g., IDs, uniforms, 
documents) 
• Discovery of suspect devices 
o Hoax device(s) 
o Functional IED(s) 
• Damage to Amtrak assets 
o Physical infrastructure 
• Assault of Amtrak employees 
10. What public health issues have occurred? • Geographic flu report 
• Communicable diseases 
• Center for Disease Control (CDC) bulletins 
• Food and Drug Administration (FDA) bulletins 
Table 2.   Amtrak Intelligence Priorities and Requirements. 
2. Multi-Discipline Dissemination  
This section will only focus on disseminating intelligence and terrorism 
information in the railroad operating environment. 
The multi-discipline personnel responsible for safely operating the railroad and 
protecting the infrastructure are the key enablers to effective intelligence information 
sharing. Frontline operations personnel are the best equipped to provide information that 
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enhances existing information to a point where it becomes actionable intelligence. They 
know what is normal and what is not normal, and can easily distinguish significant events 
from seemingly insignificant events. Frontline railroad personnel are specifically trained 
and skilled to detect small variations in the physical characteristics of their operating 
environment.85 Even with this ability to detect things out of the ordinary, they need to 
know the suspicious activity of interest, and where to concentrate their efforts. For 
intelligence to become actionable in the railroad environment: 
1. The railroad police, train crew, and station staff must be part of Amtrak’s 
intelligence cycle; and 
2. The Division General Superintendents86 (operations), Division Engineers 
(infrastructure), Master Mechanics (rolling stock), and the Police 
Inspectors must be part of the intelligence cycle with their local 
intelligence community and law enforcement agencies. 
The functional operating characteristics of the railroad environment are the same 
as Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe’s model for intelligence-led policing shown in Figure 7. Multi-
discipline front line operating personnel, or intelligence gatherers, interpret what they are 
witnessing in the operating environment. Key decision makers, such as Chief Operating 
Officers, national operation center personnel, and Division management, are influenced 
by intelligence, and use intelligence to impact the operating environment. Ratcliffe refers 
to this as the 3i model: interpret, influence, and impact. 
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86 General Superintendents are responsible for all railroad operations in a geographic territory. Amtrak 





Figure 7.   An intelligence-led policing and crime reduction process.87 
The substantive impact of this model will be to eliminate inconsequential 
incidents and events, and allow constrained resources to be focused on the events that 
have potential consequences. The front line work force will be more engaged through a 
common objective and purpose. This model will alter the traditional paradigm of only 
allowing the intelligence community or law enforcement to be involved in the 
intelligence cycle. They will no longer view reporting suspicious activity as yet another 
task added to their already long list of duties. The workforce will see the results of their 
input, and become more engaged. By not including all disciplines in the intelligence 
cycle, valuable information will be overlooked, and a significant resource of information 
will remain untapped. 
In order to provide actionable intelligence and terrorism information at all levels 
in the corporation, the intelligence briefings and reports must be disseminated as follows:  
 
 
                                                 
87 Jerry H. Ratcliffe, “Intelligence-led Policing Australian Institute of Criminology,” Trends & Issues 
in Crime and Criminal Justice, 248 (April 2003): 3. 
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1. As part of the General Bulletin Order (GBO) and Daily Bulletin Order 
(DBO)88 when warranted;  
2. National Operation Center (NOC) management (Chief of Systems 
Operations, Directors of Systems Operations, etc.) shall be provided a 
daily briefing on the intelligence information relevant for the entire 
system; 
3. Division management (General Superintendent, Division Engineer, Master 
Mechanic, etc.) shall be provided a daily briefing on the intelligence 
information relevant to their geographic territory, but in the context of the 
global threat of terrorism to the system; 
4. Train Dispatch Center management (Superintendent Operations, Assistant 
Superintendent Train Movements, etc.) shall be provided a daily briefing 
on the intelligence information relevant to their geographic territory, but in 
the context of the global threat of terrorism to the system; 
5. The Chief Operating Officer shall be provided a daily briefing that 
summarizes intelligence information for the system; 
6. The Security Governance Council89 shall be provided a briefing at its 
monthly meeting that summarizes intelligence information trends; and 
7. The Board of Directors shall be provided an intelligence information 
briefing at its monthly meeting that summarizes intelligence information 
trends. 
As each level of the organization consumes the intelligence information, they 
should be required to provide feedback on the usefulness and how well it meets the 
defined requirements. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter defined Amtrak’s intelligence and terrorism information priorities 
and requirements (Table 2) including dissemination criteria. It specifically established: 
 
                                                 
88 Bulletin orders contain special instructions that modify the normal operating rules for a specific 
geographic area. They also contain general information related to the operation such as speed restrictions, 
weather, special train movements, a safety rule of the day, and security information. In accordance with 
federal law and the corporation’s operating rules, all operating personnel are required to read and 
understand the orders before engaging and assuming their responsibilities for that tour of duty (shift). 
89 Amtrak’s Security Governance Council is chaired by the President & CEO, and includes the 
following officers of the corporation: the Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Vice President – 
Office of Security Strategy & Special Operations, and the General Counsel & Corporate Secretary. 
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• The nature of the information required to protect the public and critical 
infrastructure; 
• The critical pathways for intelligence in an effective system; and 
• The critical nodes and decision makers that require timely intelligence to 
protect the public and critical infrastructure. 
The next chapter will present a case study on the NYPD SHIELD operation and 
intelligence products as a potential means of fulfilling these requirements, and evidence 
of the strength of informal megacommunity networks.  
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V. NYPD SHIELD CASE STUDY 
A. OVERVIEW OF NYPD SHIELD 
NYPD SHIELD is regarded by the intelligence, law enforcement, and private 
sector communities as a leading, but sometimes controversial, model for intelligence and 
terrorism information sharing between the public and private sectors. Between January 
and May 2008, the author performed a case study on the NYPD SHIELD operation. The 
author toured the NYPD SHIELD headquarters and interviewed key personnel on the 
operation. The documentation acquired and the collected testimonial data collected was 
qualitatively analyzed and compared with Amtrak’s intelligence requirements as 
presented in Chapter IV.  
On February 8, 2008, the author met with Inspector Peter Winski (Executive 
Director, Counterterrorism Division, NYPD) and other Counterterrorism Division staff to 
be briefed on the NYPD SHIELD operation. Detective Charles Ambio presented an 
overview of the NYPD SHIELD operation, and provided the author with detailed written 
information on the initiative.90 The following summarizes the information acquired at the 
February 2008 meeting, and subsequent discussions with Inspector Winski and Detective 
Ambio. 
The NYPD SHIELD program is a public-private partnership based on information 
sharing that specifically seeks assistance from the private sector with the sole purpose of 
safeguarding the city. The current staffing includes one lieutenant, two sergeants, and 
four detectives, which is surprisingly small considering NYPD SHIELD’s measureable 
accomplishments. The membership is comprised of both public and private organizations 
such as financial institutions, cultural institutions, hotels, hospitals, law enforcement 
                                                 
90 On February 8, 2008, NYPD Detective Charles Ambio provided the author with a binder that 
contained a detailed overview presentation on NYPD SHIELD; links to relevant Internet information; 
Threat Analysis presentations for three recent terrorist attacks; the NYPD SHIELD Course Catalog for 
Corporate & Private Sector Training; a sample Vetting Report for Vornado Realty Trust; sample NYPD 
SHIELD alerts; positive domestic and foreign news articles on NYPD and the SHIELD operation; and 
letters of commendation from private sector corporations. 
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(federal, state, and local), and government agencies (federal, state, and local). They 
currently have 4,325 members representing 1,897 organizations in 46 U.S. states and 12 
countries. The membership and organizations are divided into the following 22 sectors: 
 
• Business Improvement Districts (BIDS) • Chemical/Petroleum 
• Cultural • Education 
• Energy/Utilities • Entertainment 
• Finance & Banking • Governmental Agencies 
• Health & Hospitals • Hospitality & Tourism 
• Law Enforcement • Maritime 
• Media • Postal/Parcel 
• Professional Services • Real Estate & Property 
Management 
• Religious • Retail/Merchant 
• Security • Telecommunications/IT 
• Transportation • Other 
 
NYPD SHIELD offers sector specific briefings, conferences, training, an 
information sharing website, and alerts. In return for these services, they ask the members 
to be the NYPD’s eyes and ears as well as share their personal knowledge on their 
neighborhood and critical infrastructure. 
1. Sector Specific Briefings and Conferences 
The sector specific briefings and conferences inform members of the current 
threat posture in New York City, and advise them of specific initiatives and the role of 
each sector. The briefings focus on the security challenges for each sector. As of 
February 2008, a total of 590 members attended eight briefings focused on the hotel, 
health and hospital, and transportation sectors. The conferences facilitate information 
sharing and provide a platform for networking between the members within a sector. 
They are scheduled about every 8 to 10 weeks at NYPD headquarters. Each conference 
last approximately 90 minutes, and is focused on current and emerging threats. The 
proceedings are distributed at the conference and posted on the secure NYPD SHIELD 
website. Past topics have included attack and plot analysis, terrorist methods of operation,  
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and emerging threats such as the role of women in jihad and the homegrown threat. As of 
February 2008, NYPD SHIELD has held 10 conferences with 2,720 members in 
attendance. 
2. Training 
NYPD SHIELD currently offers training on critical infrastructure protection, 
terrorism awareness, vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), and 
detecting hostile surveillance. The five-day critical infrastructure protection course is 
aimed at corporate and private security directors and managers. The course content 
includes the principles of risk assessment, basic methods of security, and the major 
components of a municipality’s infrastructure. The terrorism awareness course is a two to 
four hour session for security professionals that covers an introduction to terrorism, 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), indicators of suicide attacks, and vehicle borne 
improvised explosive devices. The four-hour VBIED course is aimed at the security 
professional. The course content includes an introduction to VBIEDs, threat assessments, 
and search techniques. The detecting surveillance course is a four-hour session for 
corporate and private security directors and managers. NYPD SHIELD has fulfilled 260 
of the 530 training requests received since the program began in August 2005. Over 40% 
of these requests are for the critical infrastructure protection course. They have held 197 
terrorism awareness sessions, 31 VBIED sessions, 20 critical infrastructure protection 
sessions, and 12 detecting hostile surveillance sessions. Since the program’s inception, a 









• McGraw Hill • NY Waterway 
• Circle Line Cruise • NYC Department of Parks and 
Recreation 
• SIAC • Real Estate Board of NY 
• Metro-Tech BID • Morgan Stanley 
• Con Edison • Times Square Alliance 
• NY Cruise Line • Battery Park City Authority 
• Time Warner Center • Hunts Point Public Safety 
• Queens Mall • Staten Island Ferry 
• Yankee and Shea Stadiums • Vornado Reality 
• Goldman Sachs  
3. Website 
The NYPD SHIELD website serves three functions: (1) it allows individuals to 
apply for membership; (2) it facilitates information sharing; and (3) it allows members to 
request training. The home page includes a security news ticker that searches 12,000 
sources from over 125 countries for relevant items of interest. It also includes links to 
best practices, intelligence and analysis briefings, past conference presentations, weekly 
newsletters, terrorism digests, and a resource library. Figure 8 shows the home page. 
 
 
Figure 8.   NYPD Internet home page – April 14, 2008.91 
                                                 
91 NYPD, “NYPD SHIELD,” NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau, http://www.nypdshield.org/public/ 
(accessed April 14, 2008). 
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4. Intelligence and Analysis Briefings 
NYPD SHIELD intelligence and analysis briefings cover worldwide terrorist 
attacks and include information on the incident, an in-depth analysis by NYPD 
Counterterrorism Division analysts, and the potential implications for New York City. 
The Mumbai Railway Bombings briefing is included in Appendix B as an example. The 
bombings occurred on July 11, 2006, and the first briefing was released the same day 
with an update issued on July 17, 2006. A conference was held on July 19, 2006 that 
included a teleconference with an NYPD Lieutenant on the scene. 
5. Resource Library 
The NYPD SHIELD website includes access to a resource library that provides 
terrorism related documents and links to various types of security (air travel, facility, 
information, etc.), and general research and reference material. The resource library 
includes downloadable tactical material such as a bomb threat checklist, a list of 
suspicious package indicators, brochures on Nexus92 and the Corporate Emergency 
Access System (CEAS)93, and a criminal description sheet.  
6. SHIELD Alerts 
NYPD SHIELD alerts are sent via e-mails to requesting members. The subject 
matter includes major incidents, suspicious packages, building evacuations, major 
demonstrations, parades, bank robberies, transit disruptions, weekend events, and rush 
hour traffic. Oddly, the e-mails are only sent weekdays between the hours of 7:30 AM 
and 8:00 PM. Alert information is sourced from NYPD Operations, Traffic Management, 
the Public Information Office, and the Office of Emergency Management as well as news 
feeds. 
                                                 
92 NEXUS is a Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) trusted traveler program that “Provides expedited 
travel via land, air or sea to approved members between the U.S. and Canada border.” 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/trusted_traveler/ (accessed April 20, 2008). 
93 “CEAS is a pre-event credentialing program, which authenticates critical business employees for 
access to restricted areas following a disaster or serious emergency using a secure identification card 
recognized by the police.” http://ceas.com/ (accessed April 20, 2008). 
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B. NYPD PERSPECTIVE 
1. Protecting the City 
During the February 8, 2008 briefing session, Detective Ambio explained that the 
primary goal of NYPD SHIELD is to engage the private sector through information 
sharing with the sole purpose of leveraging the private sector resources to help protect the 
city. He went on to explain that although it was important to meet and brief the private 
sector executives, their real objective is to establish a relationship with frontline security 
and operations personnel. According to Detective Ambio, “the private security guard 
knows the routine of their environment. The operating personnel can quickly identify the 
critical assets, and know the vulnerabilities in their business.”94 With a small amount of 
training, private sector personnel can be an invaluable source of information, and a 
significant counterterrorism resource. 
2. Protecting the City through Intelligence Information 
On February 27, 2008, the Northeast Corridor Coalition95 had their quarterly 
meeting in New York. In attendance were NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly, the author, 
and representatives from the major law enforcement agencies along Amtrak’s Northeast 
Corridor. The NYPD provided a detailed and comprehensive unclassified (for official use 
only) briefing as part of the meeting. The author observed that it fulfilled a general need 
for intelligence and terrorism information by the participants. It provided relevant and 
timely fact based information in the context of the terrorist threat to New York, the major 
east coast cities, and the country. They clearly stated what they knew, and what they did 
not know. The NYPD share the information with many other similar groups or coalitions 
that include state and local representatives as well as the private sector.  
                                                 
94 Detective Ambio (Detective, New York City Police Department), interview with the author, New 
York, NY, February 8, 2008. 
95 The essence of this coalition is collaboration between Amtrak and state and local law enforcement 
agencies for the sole purpose of providing a larger presence in stations and on-board our trains. It has been 
functioning for almost two years and a significant increase in law enforcement presence at stations and on-
board our trains along the Northeast Corridor has been seen at no additional expense to Amtrak. 
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In a private session with Commissioner Kelly, the author asked why he stationed 
NYPD personnel overseas to gather intelligence as this is not a traditional role for a 
municipal police department. The Commissioner explained that if they can get unfiltered 
information quicker, they may be able to turn it into valuable intelligence that saves lives 
in New York City. In Kelly’s opinion, it is necessary to be at the source to get unfiltered 
information.96 He made this abundantly clear to the nation with this statement: 
We need the information. We’re a city, the only U.S. City, of course, 
that’s been attacked, twice successfully, by terrorists. We can’t rely solely 
on other agencies to protect us here. So there’s nothing like self-help, and 
that’s what we’re doing.97 
Clearly, Commissioner Kelly has very little confidence the intelligence community will 
share timely intelligence. According to Inspector Winski, the converse is not true. 
Intelligence acquired by NYPD is shared with the FBI and State Department overseas. 
When it reaches New York, it is shared with the FBI JTTF.98 
NYPD Inspector Winski, similarly, expressed the importance of source credibility 
in an interview with the author on February 8, 2008. The example he provided was an 
August 10, 2007 threat to Washington, D.C. and New York City involving a radiological 
device (dirty bomb). The source was initially deemed to be credible with the threat 
intelligence being provided by the New York FBI JTTF. At the direction of 
Commissioner Kelly, radiological detectors and personnel were deployed at the access 
roads leading to Manhattan in an attempt to create a secure perimeter. The objective was 
to have all vehicles pass through a radiological detection screening process before 
entering the core of the city. Over the course of the ensuing weekend, the credibility of 
the source waned and was ultimately deemed to be not credible by the FBI JTTF. The 
countermeasures were withdrawn by early the next week. According to Inspector Winski, 
“unfiltered information and source credibility is critical in the counterterrorism decision 
                                                 
96 Ray Kelly (Commissioner, New York City Police Department), discussion with the author, New 
York, NY, February 27, 2008.  
97 Ed Bradley, “Inside the NYPD’s Anti-Terror Fight,” 60 Minutes, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/17/60minutes/main1416824.shtml (accessed June 17, 2008). 
98 Peter Winski (Inspector – Executive Director, New York City Police Department), e-mail message 
to the author, June 17, 2008. 
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making process.”99 If the source of the intelligence in Inspector Winski’s example is 
initially deemed to be not credible, the cost of deploy equipment and personnel as well as 
the disruption to the city could have been avoided without a detrimental impact to risk. 
C. NYPD SHIELD VS. AMTRAK REQUIREMENTS 
Valued by the private sector and non-law enforcement public sector agencies, 
loathed by the intelligence community and other law enforcement agencies, NYPD 
SHIELD briefing reports provide a timely tangible report that can be disseminated as part 
of an effort to lead and motivate a large workforce to remain focused on security. NYPD 
SHIELD keeps the vigilance drumbeat going and reminds everyone of the ever present 
threat of terrorism. The NYPD SHIELD incident briefings are controversially valued for 
the following reasons: 
1. No one else is doing what they do; 
2. They produce a product within hours of an international or domestic 
terrorist incident;  
3. They are widely disseminated with the lowest level of restrictions;  
4. They are brief and to the point;  
5. They include relevant background;  
6. They include excellent photographs;  
7. They include an incident time-line;  
8. They are based on the ground truth (fact based);  
9. They clearly state what they know and what they do not know; and  
10. NYPD SHIELD has credibility whether you like it or not.  
The private sector, and a significant portion of the public sector, is ambivalent to who 
issues the briefing reports within the intelligence community as long as they are accurate, 
timely, and meet their requirements. NYPD SHIELD is currently the only organization 
issuing these types of briefings to the private sector.  
 
                                                 
99 Peter Winski (Inspector – Executive Director, New York City Police Department), interview with 
the author, New York, NY, February 8, 2008. 
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In terms of meeting Amtrak’s intelligence priorities and requirements, the NYPD 
SHIELD briefing reports fall well short. Table 3 compares the NYPD SHIELD briefing 
reports with Amtrak’s intelligence priorities and requirements. This gap analysis shows 
that only one of the ten questions is routinely answered by their briefing reports. The 
popularity of the NYPD SHIELD product can only be explained by the demand for 
intelligence and terrorism information in the private and non-law enforcement public 
sector. Another way to state this argument is to conclude any intelligence information is 
good intelligence. This is clearly not the case with NYPD SHIELD briefing reports 
fulfilling Amtrak’s intelligence requirements. If the other entities that support and 
promote NYPD SHIELD briefing reports carefully consider their specific intelligence 
priorities and requirements, they will also likely conclude the reports do not meet their 
specific intelligence needs. Their tendency to support and promote the NYPD SHIELD 
product comes from fulfilling the demand for intelligence information under a constant 
threat of terrorism, not from fulfilling their intelligence requirements. 
  
Amtrak Intelligence Priorities & Requirements 




1. What natural events will impact 
Amtrak operations? 
• Weather (predicted or actual – 
flood, hurricane, wildfire, 
tornado, earthquake, snow, 
mud slides, excessive heat or 
cold, etc.) 
: 
2. What infrastructure events will 
impact Amtrak operations? 
• Fire/Explosion (accidental or 
equipment failure) 
• Accidents adjacent to/in 
vicinity of right-of-way (e.g., 
gasoline tanker accident on 
adjacent highway) 
• HAZMAT incidents adjacent 
to/in vicinity of right-of-way 
(e.g., gas leaks) 
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closures (structural, not 
security related closures) 
• Military movements/activities 
(e.g., missile launches from 
Vandenberg AFB) 
• Bridge strikes 
• Movable bridge strikes 
• Movable bridge failures 
• Derailments 
• Slow order applications to 
infrastructure events (e.g., 
concrete tie replacement, 
Sperry car, geometry car) 
• Communication system 
failures 
• Signal system failures 
• Catenary wire down 
• Broken rail 
• Theft of property (e.g., copper 
wire) 
3. What anticipated political 
activities will impact Amtrak 
operations? 
• Movement of VIPs (e.g., 
POTUS movements, Pope’s 
visit to D.C. and NY) 
• Planned demonstrations (e.g., 
animal/environmental rights 
activists protesting near train 
stations or using rail for 
transport to/from 
demonstration site) 
• Current political issues (e.g., 
Tibet protests against Olympic 
torch) 
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• International incidents/policy 
decisions that might cause 
terrorist backlash (e.g., Paris 
riots; Mohammed media 
cartoons; Israeli/Arab peace 
talks/conflicts) 
4. What are the threats to 
transportation nodes in general, 
and rail nodes in particular? 
• International threats 
• Domestic threats 
o Threats to employees 
o Threats to passengers 
o Threats to facilities 
: 
5. What events have occurred 
which would warrant increased 
vigilance by Amtrak? 
• International terrorist attacks 
against transportation facilities 
• Domestic terrorist attacks 
; 
6. What criminal activities will 
impact Amtrak operations? 
• Trespassing 
• Vandalism damaging critical 
infrastructure 
• Sabotage 
• Assault of Amtrak employees 
• Theft (e.g., recent theft of 
copper electrical traction 
returns) 
• Arson 
• Bomb threats 
: 
7. What domestic or international 
terrorist organizations are 
planning on attacking domestic 
rail facilities, and where will 
they attack? 
• Left-wing terrorism 
• Right-wing terrorism 
• Single issue (e.g., ELF or 
ALF) terrorism 
• Ethnic terrorism 
• Religious terrorism (e.g., 
Islamic radicalization) 
: 
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• Theft of security materials 
(e.g., IDs, uniforms, 
documents) 
• Purchase of IED/explosive 
components 
• Rehearsals/dry runs 
• Discovery of suspect devices 
9. What terrorism pre-incident 
indicators have occurred? 
• Surveillance 
o physical and 
photographic 
surveillance 





• Theft of security materials 
(e.g., IDs, uniforms, 
documents) 
• Discovery of suspect devices 
o Hoax device(s) 
o Functional IED(s) 
• Damage to Amtrak assets 
o Physical infrastructure 
• Assault of Amtrak employees 
: 
11. What public health issues have 
occurred? 
• Geographic flu report 
• Communicable diseases 
• CDC bulletins 
• FDA bulletins 
: 
Table 3.   NYPD SHIELD Reports vs. Amtrak Intelligence Priorities and Requirements. 
NYPD SHIELD, however, should be recognized as a leader in intelligence and 
terrorism information sharing. They are, and continue to be, the catalyst in the paradigm 
shift from law enforcement agencies traditionally reluctant to share information outside 
of their circles to one that shares with other non-law enforcement public sector entities, 
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the private sector, and the intelligence community. NYPD SHIELD punched a hole in the 
wall of separation100 between law enforcement, the intelligence community, and the 
private sector. 
D. THE NYPD SHIELD MEGACOMMUNITY 
The earlier sections in this chapter presented a detailed case study on the NYPD 
SHIELD operation and the intelligence products they disseminate to their members. It 
included Commissioner Kelly’s and NYPD’s perspective on protecting the city through 
intelligence sharing which, as expected, was focused on detecting and deterring another 
terrorist attack. The case study concluded with an analysis on how well their briefing 
products fulfill Amtrak’s intelligence priorities and requirements. The analysis showed 
that the incident briefings met only one of Amtrak’s ten requirements, but noted that 
NYPD SHIELD initiated a controversial paradigm shift in intelligence sharing. A list of 
the top ten reasons as to why their incident briefings are valued by the public and private 
sectors was also presented. Although this list provides some anecdotal evidence, the real 
value innovation is their network of government, business, and civil society members. 
Without realizing it, NYPD SHIELD created a megacommunity. They have strong and 
weak ties with state and local government agencies, critical private sector businesses, and 
neighborhood groups. The 22 sectors listed earlier are repeated in Figure 9, but 
categorized by government, business, or civil society. Again, the position of each entity 
relative to each other is not important. What is important is the assigned group. 
                                                 
100 William P. Barr, “Statement of William P. Barr to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States,” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
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Figure 9.   The NYPD SHIELD megacommunity. 
NYPD SHIELD built a network of strong and weak ties by hosting sector specific 
briefings and conferences, providing free onsite training, and direct discussions with the 
key leadership and front line personnel of state and local governments, private businesses 
and neighborhood groups. All of this was done without codifying the network. NYPD 
SHIELD continues to fill a void, and in return, all that is asked is if something is seen, 
say something. It is a simple social contract built on trust that acts as a catalyst for 
growing a vast network engaged in intelligence sharing. 
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E. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a case study on the NYPD SHIELD operation and 
intelligence products as a potential means of fulfilling Amtrak’s intelligence and 
terrorism information priorities and requirements. The analysis concluded that: 
• NYPD SHIELD initiated, and continues to be the catalyst in the paradigm 
shift from a reluctance to share information with the private sector to 
intelligence collaboration between the public and private sectors; 
• The NYPD SHIELD incident briefings are controversially valued for the 
following reasons: 
1. No one else is doing what they do; 
2. They produce a product within hours of an international or 
domestic terrorist incident; 
3. They are widely disseminated with the lowest level of restrictions; 
4. They are brief and to the point; 
5. They include relevant background; 
6. They include excellent photographs; 
7. They include an incident time-line; 
8. They are based on the ground truth (fact based); 
9. They clearly state what they know and what they do not know; and 
10. They have credibility whether you like it or not.  
• The NYPD SHIELD briefing reports only meet one of Amtrak’s ten 
intelligence priorities; and 
• NYPD has demonstrated what can be accomplished in a community 
network built solely on trust. 
The next chapter will present a case study on the British Transport Police (BTP) 
Counterterrorism briefing report as a potential example of an intelligence product that 
could fulfill the intelligence priorities and requirements defined in Chapter IV.  
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VI. BRITISH TRANSPORT POLICE MODEL 
A. BTP COUNTERTERRORISM UNIT BRIEFING REPORT VS. AMTRAK 
REQUIREMENTS 
With only one of the ten Amtrak intelligence requirements met by the NYPD 
SHIELD briefing reports, the author researched other intelligence reports more specific to 
passenger rail. One potential model is the British Transport Police (BTP) 
Counterterrorism Unit briefing shown in Appendix C. Although the BTP 
Counterterrorism briefing report, and the information it contains, is specific to British 
Rail, a comparative analysis of the model, framework, and type of information with 
Amtrak’s intelligence and terrorism information requirements is valuable in the 
development of Amtrak’s intelligence information doctrine. Table 4 compares the BTP 
Counterterrorism Unit briefing reports with Amtrak’s intelligence priorities and 
requirements. This gap analysis shows that five of the ten questions are routinely 
answered by their briefing reports.  
  
Amtrak Intelligence Priorities & Requirements 




1. What natural events will impact 
Amtrak operations? 
• Weather (predicted or actual – 
flood, hurricane, wildfire, 
tornado, earthquake, snow, 
mud slides, excessive heat or 
cold, etc.) 
: 
2. What infrastructure events will 
impact Amtrak operations? 
• Fire/Explosion (accidental or 
equipment failure) 
• Accidents adjacent to/in 
vicinity of right-of-way (e.g., 
gasoline tanker accident on 
adjacent highway) 
• HAZMAT incidents adjacent 
to/in vicinity of right-of-way 
(e.g., gas leaks) 
: 
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• Loss of power 
• Construction/mandated 
closures (structural, not 
security related closures) 
• Military movements/activities 
(e.g., missile launches from 
Vandenberg AFB) 
• Bridge strikes 
• Movable bridge strikes 
• Movable bridge failures 
• Derailments 
• Slow order applications to 
infrastructure events (e.g., 
concrete tie replacement, 
Sperry car, geometry car) 
• Communication system 
failures 
• Signal system failures 
• Catenary wire down 
• Broken rail 
• Theft of property (e.g., copper 
wire) 
3. What anticipated political 
activities will impact Amtrak 
operations? 
• Movement of VIPs (e.g., 
POTUS movements, Pope’s 
visit to D.C. and NY) 
• Planned demonstrations (e.g., 
animal/environmental rights 
activists protesting near train 
stations or using rail for 
transport to/from 
demonstration site) 
• Current political issues (e.g., 
Tibet protests against Olympic 
torch) 
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• International incidents/policy 
decisions that might cause 
terrorist backlash (e.g., Paris 
riots; Mohammed media 
cartoons; Israeli/Arab peace 
talks/conflicts) 
4. What are the threats to 
transportation nodes in general, 
and rail nodes in particular? 
• International threats 
• Domestic threats 
o Threats to employees 
o Threats to passengers 
o Threats to facilities 
; 
5. What events have occurred 
which would warrant increased 
vigilance by Amtrak? 
• International terrorist attacks 
against transportation facilities 
• Domestic terrorist attacks 
; 
6. What criminal activities will 
impact Amtrak operations? 
• Trespassing 
• Vandalism damaging critical 
infrastructure 
• Sabotage 
• Assault of Amtrak employees 
• Theft (e.g., recent theft of 
copper electrical traction 
returns) 
• Arson 
• Bomb threats 
; 
7. What domestic or international 
terrorist organizations are 
planning on attacking domestic 
rail facilities, and where will 
they attack? 
• Left-wing terrorism 
• Right-wing terrorism 
• Single issue (e.g., ELF or 
ALF) terrorism 
• Ethnic terrorism 
• Religious terrorism (e.g., 
Islamic radicalization) 
: 
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• Theft of security materials 
(e.g., IDs, uniforms, 
documents) 
• Purchase of IED/explosive 
components 
• Rehearsals/dry runs 
• Discovery of suspect devices 
9. What terrorism pre-incident 
indicators have occurred? 
• Surveillance 
o physical and 
photographic 
surveillance 





• Theft of security materials 
(e.g., IDs, uniforms, 
documents) 
• Discovery of suspect devices 
o Hoax device(s) 
o Functional IED(s) 
• Damage to Amtrak assets 
o Physical infrastructure 
• Assault of Amtrak employees 
; 
10. What public health issues have 
occurred? 
• Geographic flu report 
• Communicable diseases 
• CDC bulletins 
• FDA bulletins 
: 
Table 4.   BTP CTU Briefing Report vs. Amtrak Intelligence Priorities and 
Requirements. 
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B. THE BRITISH TRANSPORT POLICE COUNTERTERRORISM UNIT 
BRIEFING: A POTENTIAL SOLUTION? 
The BTP Counterterrorism Unit briefing is routinely issued for terrorist activity 
abroad and within their system. The information is more detailed and actionable than the 
products issued in the U.S., including NYPD SHIELD. The briefings include information 
on: 
1. threat level assessments; 
2. legal authority; 
3. domestic counterterrorism intelligence including photographs of 
individuals-of-interest, names, dates of birth, addresses, and incidents; 
4. individuals that have a grievance with domestic law enforcement 
including incident details, photographs, names, dates of birth, and 
addresses; 
5. terrorist tactics; 
6. significant terrorism incidents aboard including photographs, maps, 
names, dates, places and incident details such as timing and delivery 
method; 
7. criminal activity that is used to support terrorism including photographs of 
individuals-of-interest; 
8. standard operating procedures for counter surveillance; 
9. counter surveillance observations; 
10. reported incidents of suspicious behavior;  
11. threats to the rail network; and 
12. upcoming events in the area. 
The BTP Counterterrorism Unit briefing fits its intended purpose of actionable 
tactical guidance for their police officers. The intelligence and terrorism information is, 
for the most part, generated from field information reported using the protocols and 
systems established during the height of the Irish Republic Army (IRA) bombings within 
the British rail network. The tactical guidance in the report provides critical intelligence 
information to the decision and policy makers responsible for developing risk mitigation 




information to be blended with intelligence. The report is updated weekly, and widely 
disseminated to frontline personnel, but classified “restricted,” which is equivalent to the 
U.S. security sensitive information classification.  
A comparative analysis on the threat, culture, governance, agency authority, and 
laws will be used to determine the applicability of the BTP Counterterrorism Support 
Unit briefing to Amtrak. As each of the aforementioned areas is a broad topic in-and-of-
itself, this analysis will focus only on the relevant facts. It, for example, will not focus on 
the Constitutional jurisprudence of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), but 
it will discuss the authority of the BTP, and the applicable law as it relates to warrants. 
1. The Threat of Terrorism in the United Kingdom 
Given the long history of terrorist attacks by the IRA during the 1970s to the late 
1990s, the UK is not unfamiliar with terrorism. In a July 2006 strategy for countering 
international terrorism submitted to Parliament, Prime Minister Blair described the new 
threat of terrorism as follows: 
The current threat from Islamist terrorism is serious and sustained. It is 
genuinely international in scope, involving a variety of groups, networks 
and individuals who are driven by particular violent and extremist beliefs. 
It is indiscriminate – aiming to cause mass casualties, regardless of the 
age, nationality, or religion of their victims; and the terrorists are often 
prepared to commit suicide to kill others. Overall, we judge that the scale 
of the threat is potentially still increasing and is not likely to diminish 
significantly for some years.101 
In the same statement, the Prime Minister made it clear that “The principal current 
terrorist threat is from radicalised individuals who are using a distorted and 
unrepresentative version of the Islamic faith to justify violence. . . . They are, however, a 
tiny minority within the Muslim communities here and abroad. Muslim communities 
themselves do not threaten our security; indeed they make a great contribution to our  
 
                                                 
101 Prime Minister Tony Blair, Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy 
(London, UK, HM Government, July 2006), 1. 
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country.”102 In a February 22, 2008 Counterterrorism Support Unit Briefing, the BTP 
assessed this threat at the Severe103 level or that an attack is highly likely on the railway 
system.104 
2. Culture and Multiculturalism 
The UK is a multicultural country that is culturally divided. In a December 2006 
speech on the duty to integrate, Prime Minister Blair describes the multicultural goal as 
follows: 
The whole point is that multicultural Britain was never supposed to be a 
celebration of division; but of diversity. The purpose was to allow people 
to live harmoniously together, despite their difference; not to make their 
difference an encouragement to discord. The values that nurtured it were 
those of solidarity, of coming together, of peaceful co-existence. The right 
to be in a multicultural society was always, always implicitly balanced by 
a duty to integrate, to be part of Britain, to be British and Asian, British 
and black, British and white.105 
Britain’s vision of a multicultural society may be one of harmony and unity, but the 
statistical data clearly shows a country that is divided along racial, ethnical, and religious 
lines. The following is a brief summary of some relevant statistics from the 2001 
census:106,107,108 
 
                                                 
102 Prime Minister Tony Blair, Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy 
(London, UK, HM Government, July 2006), 1. 
103 The UK uses a threat level indicator with five levels: Low – an attack is unlikely; Moderate – an 
attack is possible, but not likely; Substantial – an attack is a strong possibility; Severe – an attack is highly 
likely; and Critical – an attack is expected imminently. 
104 British Transport Police, Counterterrorism Support Unit Briefing (London, UK: British Transport 
Police, February 22, 2008), 3.  
105 Prime Minister Blair, “Our Nation’s Future – Multiculturalism and Integration,” Number 10 
Downing Street, http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page10563.asp (accessed February 29, 2008). 
106 National Statistics, Focus on Ethnicity and Religion (Newport, UK: Office of National Statistics, 
2006). 
107 National Statistics, “Age & Sex Distribution,” National Statistics – Focus on Religion, 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=955 (accessed February 29, 2008). 
108 National Statistics, Focus on Religion – 2004 Summary Report (Newport, UK: Office of National 
Statistics, 2004). 
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• Total population of Great Britain is 57.1 million 
• 92% of the population is white with the remaining 8% comprised of: 
• 4.0% Asian 
• 2.0% Black 
• 1.2% Mixed – white/black/Caribbean, white/black/African, 
white/Asian 
• 0.4% Chinese 
• The largest ethnic groups within the population of Great Britain are: 
• 1.8% Indian 
• 1.3% Pakistani 
• 1.0% Black Caribbean 
• 0.8% Black African 
• The top four religious groups within the population of Great Britain are: 
• 71.8% Christian 
• 15.1% No religion 
• 7.8% Religion not stated 
• 2.8% Muslim 
• 70% of the Muslim population within Great Britain is under the age of 34 
• Muslims rank the lowest in terms of social and economic status: 
• Muslims have the largest households with an average of 3.8 people 
per household compared to 2.3 for Christians 
• 34% of Muslim households contain five or more people 
• 32% of Muslim households were considered to be living in 
overcrowded accommodations 
• 31% of working age Muslims do not have any educational 
qualifications 
• 14% and 15% of Muslim men and women, respectively, are 







• 30% of Muslim men are economically inactive compared to 16% 
of Christian men 
• 68% of Muslim women are economically inactive compared to 
25% of Christian women 
• 38% of Muslims live in London 
Figure 10 shows the geographic distribution of Christians and Muslims in Great Britain. 
Overlaying these two figures clearly shows the divide between the two largest religious 
groups. This is particularly true in London, as shown in the inset. 
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Figure 10.   Christian and Muslim population distribution in Great Britain.109 
                                                 
109 National Statistics, “Download Maps: Religion by UA/Local Authority (GB),” Focus on Religion, 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/Product.asp?vlnk=13209 (accessed February 29, 2008). 
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3. Governance 
The UK system of government is based on a unitary parliamentary democracy110 
in comparison to the presidential – congressional federalist111 system in the U.S. The 
difference between the two systems is defined by the location of the executive power. In 
the British system, it resides in the Cabinet, and in the U.S., it resides with the President. 
The British Prime Minister is elected by winning a majority of seats in the House of 
Commons. The elected Prime Minister of the majority party forms a Cabinet from the 
elected members of Parliament. The authority of the Cabinet, and support from the 
majority in the House of Commons, assures the Prime Minister that legislation, and new 
policy put forth by the majority party controlled Ministries is passed. Whereas, in the 
U.S., legislation must be passed by an independently elected Senate and House before 
going on to conference, and approval by the President. 
In the framework of counterterrorism, homeland security, and civil liberties, the 
fundamental difference between the UK and U.S. systems of government is the absence 
of a written constitution specifying the rights of the people in the UK system. The British 
Parliament has final authority and looks to Acts of Parliament, standards, and long-
standing traditions for the basis of their governance. The U.S. Supreme Court has final 
authority over the constitutionality of U.S. laws including those involving 
counterterrorism, homeland security, and civil liberties. This difference is further 
highlighted by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.112 
                                                 
110 The Oxford dictionary definition of unitary is a political system that advocates national or 
political unit. 
111 The Oxford dictionary definition of federalism is a political system that favors a strong central 
government. 
112 United States Congress, “The Constitution of the United States,” 22nd Edition of the Pocket 
Version (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 22. 
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The amendment presumes that a search or seizure is unreasonable unless a warrant has 
been issued by the court after showing probable cause on a case-by-case basis. Whereas, 
under the British system of government, Parliament has enacted laws that effectively 
delegate this authority to the police if they have reasonable suspicion that a crime has 
been, or is about to be committed.  
4. Agency Authority & Laws 
The BTP has its roots in the law enforcement divisions of the railway companies 
formed in the 19th century by the British Parliament. (If there is interest in this history, 
the BTP website113 is recommended as a good introduction to the topic.) The 1949 
British Transport Commission Act brought the various railway police organizations under 
the control of the British Railways Board (BRB). The BTP is responsible for policing the 
railways114 in Great Britain as well as the London Underground, the Docklands Light 
Railway, Croydon Tramlink, and the Midland Metro, which are considered tramways.115 
The BTP’s geographic area of responsibility includes England, Scotland, and Wales, but 
not Northern Ireland. Its oversight agency is the British Transport Police Authority 
(BTPA), which is currently a 13-member board that reports to the Secretary of State for 
the Home Department. Figure 11 depicts the details of these relationships. 
                                                 
113 British Transport Police, “BTP History Archive,” 
http://www.btp.police.uk/History%20Society/history%20society%20main.htm (accessed February 24, 
2008). 
114 Britain’s Transport and Works Act of 1992 defines a railway as a system of transport employing 
parallel rails which –  
(a) provide support and guidance for vehicles carried on flanged wheels, and 
(b) form a track which either is of a gauge of at least 350 millimeters or crosses a 
carriageway (whether or not on the same level), but does not include a tramway. 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1992/ukpga_19920042_en_6 (accessed February 24, 
2008). 
115 Britain’s Transport and Workers Act of 1992 defines a tramway as a system of transport used 
wholly or mainly for the carriage of passengers and employing parallel rails which, 
(a)  provide support and guidance for vehicles carried on flanged wheels, and 
(b) are laid wholly or mainly along a street or in any other place to which the public has 
access (including a place to which the public has access only on making a payment). 




Figure 11.   BTP reporting structure. 
The Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 authorized the establishment of the 
BTPA and the BTP: 
20  Establishment of Police Force 
The [British Transport Police] Authority shall secure the maintenance of 
an efficient and effective police Force – 
(a) to be known as the British Transport Police Force, and 
(b) to police the railways.116 
Section 31 of the Act specifies the police constables’ jurisdiction to include all the 
powers and privileges of a constable: 
(a) on track, 
(b) on network, 
(c) in a station, 
                                                 
116 House of Commons, Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 (c.20), (London, UK: July 10, 2003), 
9. 
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(d) in a light maintenance depot, 
(e) on other land used for purposes of or in relation to a railway, 
(f) on other land in which a person who provides railway services has 
a freehold or leasehold interest, and 
(g) throughout Great Britain for a purpose connected to a railway or to 
anything occurring on or in relation to a railway.117 
It also grants the police constable authority to enter track, a network, a station, a 
maintenance depot, and railway vehicles: 
(a) without a warrant, 
(b) using reasonable force if necessary, and 
(c) whether or not an offence has been committed.118 
The Anti-terrorism, Crime & Security Act 2001 and the Police Reform Act 2002 extended 
these powers beyond the railways, and effectively gave them local police powers: 
(2) Members of the British Transport Police Force have in any police area 
the same powers and privileges as constables of the police force for that 
police area—  
(a) in relation to persons whom they suspect on reasonable grounds of 
having committed, being in the course of committing or being 
about to commit an offence, or 
(b) if they believe on reasonable grounds that they need those powers 
and privileges in order to save life or to prevent or minimise 
personal injury.119 
The only conditions the Act prescribes on these powers is that the police constable must 
be in uniform, have proper identification, and where waiting on a local police constable 
would frustrate or seriously prejudice the need to exercise the powers. 
                                                 
117 House of Commons, Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 (c.20), (London, UK: July 10, 2003), 
14. 
118 Ibid. 
119 House of Commons, Anti-terrorism, Crime & Security Act 2001, (London, UK: December 14, 
2001), Part 10, Section 100. 
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C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS & JUSTIFICATION 
Although the governance, laws, and policing authorities differ between the U.S. 
and the UK, the global threat of terrorist attacks against passenger rail is the same. In the 
case of the UK, however, the threat is amplified by the stark cultural, sociological, and 
economic divide between the Christian and Muslim populations. The BTP 
Counterterrorism Unit briefing follows Britain’s traditional application of intelligence 
and law enforcement information sharing. Under the Patriot Act, the U.S. has 
significantly shifted its laws and policies towards the long-standing practices of the UK. 
The intelligence and law enforcement information sharing practices in the two countries 
is founded in substantively different laws and governance, but they arrive at the same 
end. Both allow for intelligence and criminal investigation information to be shared 
between the respective groups under specific circumstances.  
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a case study on the BTP Counterterrorism Unit briefing as 
a potential example of the type of intelligence product that could fulfill Amtrak’s 
intelligence priorities and requirements: The analysis concluded that:  
• The BTP Counterterrorism Unit briefing fulfills five of the ten intelligence 
requirements defined in Chapter IV; 
• The BTP Counterterrorism Unit briefing is a smart practice120 that has 
been successfully applied in a culturally, sociologically, and economically 
divided country; and 
• The BTP Counterterrorism Unit briefing is an example of the type of 
intelligence product required, but not being produced, in the passenger rail 
transportation sector. 
The next, and final, chapter of this thesis will conclude with recommended 
resources required to: 
1. Produce intelligence products that meet all ten of the requirements using 
the BTP briefing report as a model; and 
2. Implement and execute the strategy proposed in Chapter III. 
                                                 
120 In A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis, Eugene Bardach defines a smart practice as an 
expression of some underlying idea – an idea about how the actions entailed by the practice work to solve a 
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VII. IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY  
A comparison of Amtrak’s intelligence needs against the two dominant 
intelligence solutions for protecting the public and critical infrastructure shows that a 
modified BTP system will work best for Amtrak. The BTP Counterterrorism Unit 
briefing fulfills five of Amtrak’s ten intelligence requirements whereas the NYPD 
SHIELD briefings only fulfill one. The BTP Counterterrorism Unit briefing is a smart 
practice, and an example of the type of intelligence product required, but not being 
produced, for the U.S. passenger rail transportation sector. An example of an intelligence 
product that meets all ten of Amtrak’s requirements is shown in Appendix D.  
A. AMTRAK’S INTELLIGENCE & TERRORISM INFORMATION UNIT 
With the intelligence community and federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies focused and consumed by their respective jurisdictional intelligence 
requirements, limited resources remain to meet the specific intelligence requirements of 
the passenger rail transportation sector. Absent adequate external assistance, a dedicated 
intelligence unit, fully integrated into railroad operations, is urgently required to meet the 
requirements defined in this thesis. Therefore, it is recommended that an intelligence unit 
be added to Amtrak’s Office of Security Strategy and Special Operations. The duties and 
responsibilities of this intelligence unit will be focused on five key missions: 
1. Be Amtrak’s primary source for intelligence products that specifically 
meet the requirements defined by the foregoing research; 
2. Be Amtrak’s single point of contact for all threat information from the 
national intelligence community; 
3. Be Amtrak’s primary point of contact for collaborative intelligence 
sharing with state and local law enforcement agencies; 
4. Be the passenger rail industry leader in international smart 
counterterrorism practices; and 
5. Be Amtrak’s source for federal security clearances. 
A minimum of ten (10) qualified intelligence experts who have demonstrated 
their abilities in all-source intelligence analysis and one (1) qualified expert Facility 
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Security Officer (FSO) will be assigned to the intelligence unit. The individuals assigned 
to this unit will possess the necessary experience, skills, and current security clearances 
required to achieve the five missions successfully. All of the analysts will have 
experience in passenger or freight rail intelligence and security.  
1. Meeting Amtrak’s Intelligence Requirements 
The first key mission of Amtrak’s intelligence unit is to establish and 
institutionalize the complete intelligence cycle. This includes establishing 
responsibilities, priorities, methods, procedures, common operation terminology and 
practices, standard operating procedures (SOPs), classified and unclassified intelligence 
libraries, record keeping systems, filing procedures, and reporting procedures. It will also 
include designing and developing intelligence workbooks and databases.  
Amtrak’s intelligence unit will manage a planning process that includes an initial 
assessment, preparing templates of specific terrorist courses of action, determining 
indicators of terrorist activities that support each template, identifying intelligence gaps, 
periodic reviews to update this planning and management effort. They will also manage 
Amtrak’s intelligence collection plan by identifying intelligence priorities, defining every 
possible collection source, and determining their capabilities and suitability for each 
intelligence requirement. They will specifically task and request multiple agencies 
according to priorities, capabilities, and suitability. The intelligence unit will monitor and 
manage this plan to ensure information flow continues and supports the collection plan 
objectives.  
The intelligence analysts will process and analyze information by evaluating 
information for relevancy, urgency, accuracy, and reliability, and by using historical 
information to develop source profiles. They will record information and compare it to 
current intelligence holdings, request clarification or substantiating information to assess 
suspect reports accurately. The intelligence analysts will specifically determine terrorist 
capabilities, weaknesses and vulnerabilities, strength, composition, disposition, tactics, 
training, doctrine, and personalities. They will define, assign, and update as required, the 
appropriate course of action for each piece of information. The intelligence analysts will 
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disseminate intelligence using appropriate methods to inform the end user. They will 
ensure that all information is analyzed and its significance clearly articulated in the 
dissemination method used so that the end user need not guess at its intelligence value.  
The intelligence unit will protect and maintain the integrity of all sensitive 
information for the corporation through the proper handling, storage, marking, and 
dissemination of all materials. They will obtain and circulate all relevant policies, 
regulations, orders, and directives regarding the handling and storage of sensitive 
information. They will establish classification and access controls and compliance 
procedures commensurate with all applicable references outlined in the foregoing. The 
intelligence unit will institute a series of checks and balances to ensure all sensitive 
information is protected accordingly. 
2. Liaison with National Level Intelligence Community 
This second key mission of Amtrak’s intelligence unit is to establish a physical 
liaison presence at, but not limited to, the following national level intelligence agencies: 
the ODNI - NCTC, DHS – OI&A, FBI - NJTTF, FBI – JTTF, and other intelligence 
related organizations and associations such as think tanks, universities, and private sector 
entities. The intelligence analysts assigned to the national intelligence community will 
represent Amtrak’s intelligence interests at these organizations by establishing personal 
contacts with key personnel and analysts. They will communicate Amtrak specific 
intelligence requests and influence the integration of Amtrak specific requirements into 
the collection activities of these agencies.  
The intelligence analysts will also educate key personnel at each organization on 
Amtrak’s specific intelligence needs. They will review the organizations’ historical 
databases, files, and other holdings as well as their current intelligence workflow to 
identify sources of information relevant to Amtrak’s needs. The intelligence analysts will 
integrate themselves into the workflow of incoming intelligence information to identify 
immediate, or perishable information relevant to Amtrak. They will also integrate 
themselves into the workflow of intelligence production to maintain current appreciation 
of intelligence trends and analyses.  
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Lastly, as part of this mission, the intelligence analyst will attend briefings, 
seminars, and meetings as required. The cumulative result of this effort will be used to 
conduct briefings as defined in Chapter IV.  
3. Collaborative Partnerships with Fusion Centers and Local Law 
Enforcement 
The third key mission involves intelligence unit personnel establishing 
collaborative relationships with federal, state, and local law enforcement officers to 
facilitate the rapid flow of information relevant to Amtrak’s security needs. They will 
travel to state and local fusion centers and critical law enforcement agencies to brief key 
personnel on Amtrak’s specific needs by explaining the congruency of Amtrak’s needs 
with the law enforcement agency requirements. They will discover the methods, 
procedures, and capabilities of the various law enforcement agencies, and determine how 
best to integrate these into the overall intelligence collection plan. The intelligence unit 
personnel will determine the intelligence holdings and relevancy of current intelligence 
workflow inputs and products. They will participate in law enforcement training, 
seminars, and briefings to gather information relevant to Amtrak’s security needs. They 
will also gain access to law enforcement intelligence organizations, agencies, and offices 
such as NYPD SHIELD that can support Amtrak’s security needs.  
Intelligence analysts will participate, as necessary, in law enforcement agency 
intelligence analysis and production efforts. They will informally evaluate each law 
enforcement agencies level of significance, accuracy, and timeliness in sharing 
intelligence and information. The historical results are used to make the most of favorable 
situations or to devote more effort to developing closer ties. 
4. Collaborate with Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agencies 
The fourth key mission for the intelligence unit is to travel to foreign countries to 
establish professional relationships with intelligence and law enforcement agencies that 
can provide intelligence and historical information (photos, after action reviews, 
debriefings, interrogation reports, event analyses) on terrorist activities against passenger 
rail service. The intelligence unit staff will attend international seminars, briefings, 
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conferences, and reviews that provide awareness and insight into terrorist tactics, 
techniques, and procedures in foreign countries. They will actively seek out information 
on opportunities to gain introductions to foreign law enforcement and intelligence 
personnel who may be visiting the U.S.  
The assigned staff will solicit invitations to seminars, briefings, and conferences 
where they may be guest speakers or in general attendance. The intelligence unit staff 
will review foreign intelligence and law enforcement periodicals, newspapers, bulletins, 
and broadcasts to identify key personnel in cooperating countries who may be able to 
provide information on terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedure used against passenger 
rail services. 
5. Security Clearance Management 
The fifth and final key mission of Amtrak’s intelligence unit is to administer and 
manage Amtrak’s federal security clearances, and security clearance application program. 
This includes, but is not limited to, clearance custodial operations, reinvestigation 
tracking and assistance, and maintenance of National Industrial Security Program Manual 
(NISPOM) mandated standards (DOD 5220.22-M). They will also verify federal 
clearances of assigned personnel through multiple federal agencies. 
B. DELIVERABLES 
Intelligence becomes valuable when it meets the priorities and requirements of the 
end user or consumer. Analysts must be proficient across a wide spectrum of oral and 
written methods of dissemination. These disseminated deliverables must be clear, 
concise, factual, and specifically note the differences between fact, unconfirmed 
information, and the intelligence expert’s analysis or conjecture. The analysts must be 
capable of providing their analysis in such a manner as to be easily understood by 
personnel who do not have an intelligence background. Amtrak’s intelligence unit will 




• Formal collection plans • White papers 
• Intelligence requests • Decision papers 
• Organizational capabilities 
briefings to external agencies 
• Intelligence annexes to plans and 
orders 
• General intelligence briefings • Tactical briefings 
• Intelligence tasks • Personnel briefings 
• VIP briefings • After action report input 
• Oral and written periodic 
intelligence summaries 
• Intelligence training and supporting 
lesson plans 
• Spot reports • Training scenarios 
• PowerPoint presentations • Red team exercises 
• Funding justification analysis • Role playing profiles 




The final chapter in this thesis argues that Amtrak is in a unique position, with its 
well-established relationships at the federal level, in 46 states, and 525 communities, to 
develop and foster an intelligence and terrorism information sharing network based on 
the megacommunity framework. It recommends that Amtrak establish an internal 
intelligence unit to meet the intelligence requirements defined by the foregoing research. 
It presented five key missions for this new intelligence unit: 
• Be Amtrak’s primary source for intelligence products; 
• Be Amtrak’s single point of contact for all threat information from the 
national intelligence community; 
• Be Amtrak’s primary point of contact for collaborative intelligence 
sharing with state and local law enforcement agencies; 
• Be the passenger rail industry leader in international smart 
counterterrorism practices; and 
• Be Amtrak’s source for federal security clearances. 
D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
When I set out to write a thesis on public – private sector intelligence and 
terrorism information sharing some 18 months ago, I had two underlying objectives: (1) 
to develop an effective strategy for intelligence and terrorism information sharing within 
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the nation’s passenger rail transportation sector; and (2) to define and develop an 
intelligence product that helps to protect the public and the nation’s critical railroad 
infrastructure. The strategy presented in Chapter III accomplishes the first objective by 
leveraging the power of informal networks in the context of the abstract megacommunity 
framework. Absent a solution from the DHS, it provides a practical solution to 
intelligence and terrorism information sharing between the federal intelligence 
community, state and local law enforcement, and the private sector. The intelligence 
requirements defined in Chapter IV (Table 2) and a product similar to the BTP 
Counterterrorism Unit briefing presented in Chapter VI fulfill the second objective. The 
outcome from both of these objectives is evidence driven, and based on what works on 
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APPENDIX B. 
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APPENDIX D.  
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